

THE PRICE OF PEACE

by

Sir William Beveridge

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
TARGET FOR TOMORROW SERIES

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PREFACE

"When the fighting in this World War ends, there are three things which each of us will need, three conditions which must be satisfied if all the efforts and sacrifices made in war are to seem worth while, as making possible a good life for ourselves and for our children. The first thing that we need is that peace when it returns shall be assured and lasting, that men of all nations shall be able in future to live without war and without fear of war. The second thing we need is that each man and woman, so long as he or she is able to work and serve and earn, shall have an opportunity of doing so. The third thing we need is that each man and woman shall be assured of an income sufficient for honourable subsistence and maintenance of any dependants when for any reason he or she is unable to work."

In these words, from the Preface to my Summary of "Full Employment in a Free Society," the three main objectives of post-war effort—peace, a job when one can work, an income when one cannot work—are named in the order of their importance and their difficulty. In dealing with them it has been natural to take the opposite order, to begin with the easiest, and work back to the hardest.

The third of the three objectives was the subject of the official Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services which I made in November, 1942, at the request of His Majesty's Government, and which took Freedom from Want as its aim. The second of the objectives was the subject of the unofficial "Report on Full Employment in a Free Society" which I published in November, 1944. The first of the objectives—the most important and the hardest to attain—forms the subject of the present work. It is an attempt to set out the terms on which we may have Freedom from War and from fear of War.

I completed a draft in September last for circulation to others more expert than myself in this field for their private criticism, as a first step to fuller collaboration. I received many helpful comments and criticisms, which have led to a drastic revision of many of my first ideas. But my election to Parliament in October last, combined with my other duties, made it impossible for me to proceed with the original plan of full collaboration, without delaying publication unduly. The winning of Freedom from War and the fear of War depends on the formation of

public opinion, in Britain and in other countries. The critical time for that is now or in the near future.

But the winning of Freedom from War, as of all other freedoms, depends on understanding as well as on desire. Within the limits of my time I have studied all that I could of what so many others have written or said on the theme of this volume. I have given many references to what I read, and I hope that, with the help of these references, those who read what I have written will be led on to further study of how lasting peace may be secured.

The present study is in two ways a work of different character from those which preceded it.

First, in writing of Social Security through Social Insurance and of Full Employment, I was dealing with subjects in regard to which I had special experience. I was helped also by others of greater experience than my own. Of the subject of the present work I can claim no special knowledge. I write of it because it is so vital, that none of us should neglect it.

Second, in each of the earlier studies it was possible to present concrete proposals—a Plan for Social Security and a Policy for Full Employment in a Free Society. The present work is concerned, not with Plan or Policy, but with *The Price of Peace*. Its theme is summed up in the title. Peace is a good which, like all other things worth having, can be won only at a price, by giving up something. The price, moreover, of any good thing can be paid only by those who have something to give, by the “haves” rather than by the “have-nots.” The price of peace has to be paid in terms both of power and of wealth by those nations which are powerful and wealthy by their deciding to use their power not for narrow advantage but for the common good of world order, by their deciding through economic co-operation to spread wealth throughout the world. The ground on which they may be asked to do this is that repeated experience of world war has shown that to be self-regarding in international affairs is the primrose path to mutual destruction, for the strong and for the weak, for the rich and for the poor alike.

W. H. BEVERIDGE.

Rothbury,
Northumberland,
January, 1945.

Postscript : While this book was passing through the press, the decisions of the Crimea Conference were announced and formed the subject of a three day debate in the House of Commons on 27th and 28th February and 1st March, 1945. The statement of decisions is printed in the Appendix and notes dealing with particular points are printed on pp. 49 and 103.

THE TARGET: RULE OF LAW IN PLACE OF ANARCHY BETWEEN NATIONS

"We have learned that those who desire to make peace must first understand the causes of war." This is the first of the twelve main lessons drawn by Mr. Harold Nicolson from the failure of the Versailles Peace Treaty.¹ Undoubtedly it is the first and most essential lesson. It may be hoped that we have learned it.

War means that international disputes, that is to say differences between nations which cannot be resolved by agreement, get settled by mass-killing. In seeking the causes of war we have thus to answer two distinct questions: what causes irreconcilable differences between nations and why do these differences lead to killing and violence? The second of these questions is the more important. Whatever the precise causes of disputes between the groups of human beings which we call nations, it must be assumed that disputes will arise from time to time between these groups, as they do between individuals within each nation. But disputes between individuals do not, in an ordered community, lead to killing and violence. That is because in an ordered community individuals live under the rule of law, which means having courts to declare the law as something binding all citizens whether they like it or not, having police to enforce the law, and having a legislature to change the law from time to time in accord with changing circumstances and needs and public opinion. Disputes between nations, on the other hand, can and do lead to killing and violence, just because there is no other means of settling disputes which both parties are bound to accept; there is no ordered community of nations, and no rule of law among them. The general condition which makes war possible is international anarchy, is the fact that there is no authority whose decisions nations must accept, if they cannot settle their differences by agreement. That is the reason why, while killing and violence on the small scale by individuals have been nearly stamped out in most countries of the world, killing and violence on the grand scale by nations continue.

To say that, in contrast to the growing peacefulness of relations between individual human beings, killing and violence as between the groups of human beings that we call nations continue, is to understate the case. War today is not a continuation—not the same as wars of past generations. It is something infinitely worse, in itself and in its possible consequences after it is over.

¹ *Peace-making*, 1919, by Harold Nicolson (first published in 1933 and republished with an introduction in 1943). The quotation is from the Introduction, p. vii.

To appreciate the difference between war today and in the past, it is only necessary to read the novels of Jane Austen, written for the most part at the height of the Napoleonic Wars. These wars hardly affected the general life of the people, and in Jane Austen's novels the military seldom appear except as dancing partners. No novel true to life could be like that in ignoring war today. There was a famous Ball before Waterloo. There were no Balls before Stalingrad, El-Alamein or D-Day. With its bombing and its blockades, its compulsory mobilisation of total manpower, its rationing of all essentials, war today is a war not of armies but of peoples, with any distinction between combatant and civilian fading continually. The "Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom" published in November, 1944 illustrate this in many ways. In five years of war there were 176,000 fatal casualties in the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom and 87,000 or just half as many among civilians including merchant seamen. This does not mean that it was nearly half as dangerous to be a civilian as to be in a fighting service, for the total number of civilians was much greater than that of the Armed Forces; the service casualties, moreover, in addition to those killed, include three times as many missing, wounded and prisoners of war. But it does mean that of every three British lives lost up to September, 1944, two were those of men and women in the Armed Forces and one was that of a civilian. The figures of damage to dwelling houses show the same aspect of total war; one house in every three in Britain has been damaged; half a million have been destroyed beyond repair or made uninhabitable. Finally we have the reduced consumption—a lowering of the average standard of life by 21%; it is true that by rationing and in other ways—this reduction has been made to fall on those persons who best could bear it and on comforts or luxuries rather than on necessities. But it is none the less a civilian contribution of vast importance to total war.

And as total war differs from the military wars of the past while it is proceeding, so it may differ in its possible results. The old wars were wars and done with; however, they ended, they let human life return to much the same in each country, conquered or conquering. But that was not the design of the Axis dictators this time. If they had won, they would have stamped out freedom; they would have riveted the chains of economic and political servitude on all their victims. The Battle of Britain in 1940 might easily have ended the other way, in favour of Germany; it probably would have done so, if the German planners had put a little less of their total resources into their Army and a little more into their Air Force. If the Battle of Britain had gone the other way, civilization might have gone from Europe; that was what we risked in being driven once more to the arbitrament of war. We should regard as unthinkable the taking of such a risk again, by leaving any room for war in the world.

As is said in the Report of a Liberal Party Committee on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals :

Ancient and modern wars are diseases of altogether different kinds. To say light-heartedly that, because there have been wars in the past, we must make up our minds to have wars in the future is like saying that, because we have suffered from colds in the past, we should reconcile ourselves to bubonic plague. Peace, like all other things worth having, can be had only at a price. Lasting peace today is worth a much higher price than ever it was before, because the alternative of war is so much more dreadful. We must at all costs win Freedom from War and from the fear of War which is a main cause of War.

Total war is a new thing in the world—one of the worst by-products of industrialisation. In one respect only is it like the wars of earlier generations. It is man-made and therefore by man it can be prevented.

On what conditions and by what methods can we find most surely a means of settling international disputes without war between the disputants? That is the fundamental question. The other question—of how disputes between nations arise—calls for examination as well, but is less important. If we can discover and eliminate the main causes of dispute between nations, we can reduce the number of wars. But it may be taken as certain that, to the end of time, human beings grouped as nations will take different views of their rights and will have disputes, about one thing or another. We may diminish the frequency of disputes but we can never hope to prevent disputes altogether. If we want to abolish war, not merely to make it less frequent, we must provide a means, alternative to war, for the settlement of international disputes, over the heads of the disputants.

International anarchy is the general condition which makes it possible for disputes between nations to result in war. International anarchy is the soil of war. The various forms of difference between nations which may lodge in this soil, can be described as the seeds of war. As will appear in the argument, international anarchy is not merely the soil of war, but carries always within it one of the most potent seeds of war—the seed of fear. International anarchy makes war not only possible, but certain to come some time. International anarchy in an industrialised world makes it certain also that war, when it comes, will be total and nearly certain that war, when it comes, will be general.

International anarchy means not merely the outbreak of war from time to time. It is a continuing condition; it means that between wars the rights and relations of nations are determined by their relative force. "Trial by battle is an exceptional incident, but the conflict of national force is continuous."¹ This means that differences between nations may

¹ R. G. Hawtrey; *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, p. 97 (Longmans Green, 1930).

be settled neither by agreement nor by open war, but by unwilling surrender on the part of the nation which feels itself weaker or less prepared for war, by what the other nation will call a diplomatic victory. Experience shows that such surrenders are often the prelude to open war. They may lead the nation which has imposed its will to make further demands later, as Germany followed the peaceful surrender of the Sudetenland in 1938 by overrunning the whole of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939. They may lead the nation which has surrendered to nurse revenge and to accept battle later when it feels stronger; the surrenders which Russia made to Germany and Austria in respect of the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and which Germany made to France and Britain in respect of Morocco in 1911 were only stages to the joining of general battle in 1914.

International anarchy means not merely the absence of law between nations, but the absence of morality. Not only by indulging in mass-killing during war, but also in their behaviour during peace, nations are expected and allowed to behave as no respectable private citizens behave, breaking solemn agreements when it suits them, practising fraud and blackmail against other nations, pursuing self-interest without shame and without remorse. "War is the continuation of political relations by other means."¹ This saying implies and is intended to imply that, in its relation to other nations, each nation at all times should be as little guided by moral considerations as it is in war. This saying comes from Germany. But even from the United States, which in general has stood at the opposite pole from Germany, in upholding the sanctity of international agreements, have come from time to time pronouncements as immoral and anarchistic. "The nation has as a matter of course a right to abrogate a treaty in a solemn and official manner for what she regards as a sufficient cause, just exactly as she has a right to declare war or exercise another power for a sufficient cause."²

The rule of law between nations means that no nation, large or small, ever takes the law into its own hands in a dispute with any other nation. In private life all respectable citizens honour their obligations, avoid blackmail, assassination, and robbery by violence, respect rights unless and until they can get them changed by orderly accepted procedure, support the police in dealing with wrong-doers. The rule of law between nations means that nations behave as if they were respectable private citizens.

The target for tomorrow in relation to peace is to discover the conditions under which and the methods by which international anarchy may be replaced by the rule of law between nations. That is the main

¹ In citing this famous observation of Clausewitz, E. H. Carr (*The Twenty Years Crisis*, p. 140) quotes also R. G. Hawtrey's definition of diplomacy as "potential war," putting the same view in even fewer words (*Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, p. 107).

² Theodore Roosevelt, quoted by H. F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, p. 309.

task for all peace-loving nations and persons, the most important of all tasks in the world today. A subsidiary task is to reduce the causes of difference between nations, so that their relations may be governed as far as possible by free agreement and do not lead to disputes which have to be settled either, as at present, by war, or in the ordered world of tomorrow, by the rule of law above their heads. In considering how we can perform these tasks and hit our target in future, the first step is to try to profit by the experience of past failures.

THE LESSON OF EXPERIENCE

THE COMING OF WORLD WAR

The main theme thus briefly stated—of international anarchy as the general condition which allows disputes between nations to issue either in open war or in unwilling surrender to force without open war—can be illustrated by examination of war in its latest and widest manifestation, the war in which we are now engaged as one of the United Nations against the Axis Powers. But to understand this war, it is not sufficient to look only at recent events, those immediately preceding 1939. The hostilities which began in 1939 should be regarded as resumption, after a twenty year truce, of the hostilities of 1914-18. "We are faced not with the prospect of a new war, but with something very like the possibility of a resumption of the war which ended in November, 1918," said Mr. Winston Churchill in March, 1935.¹ In his volume on *Conditions of Peace*, published in 1942, Mr. E. H. Carr speaks of "the contemporary war of which the first outbreak occurred in 1914 and the second in 1939."² The necessity for treating the "First World War" of 1914-18 and the "Second World War" of 1939 as two outbreaks of the same malady will appear plainly in the course of the argument. It is important to understand just why the attempt made in 1919 not only to end the war of 1914-18, but to ensure lasting peace failed so soon and so completely, but it is even more important to understand how war came in 1914.

This is a subject dealt with in innumerable books. Among those readily accessible and without too great profusion of detail are *Fifty Years of Europe* by J. A. Spender (Cassell, 1933), *England, 1870-1914* by R. C. K. Ensor (Clarendon Press, 1936) and a study of German Foreign Policy *From Bismarck to the World War* by Professor Erich Brandenburg of the University of Leipzig. This last, though written from the German point of view to clear Germany of the charge of war guilt, is a scholarly and serious work, based on diplomatic documents published in many countries or, in Germany, made specially available to the author. It has been translated into English by Annie E. Adams and published by the Oxford University Press, a third impression being issued in 1938. This translation is cited below as "Brandenburg." The author's main thesis in defence of Germany is that in the period 1890-1914 "no one can pretend with any show of reason that at any given time she either

¹ *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 199. This collection of speeches from October, 1928 to March, 1938, published in 1938, by George Hawap and Co., should be read by every one who can get hold of it. It is cited here repeatedly.

² *Conditions of Peace*, p. 3 (Macmillan, 1942).

wished for war or strove to bring it about. Had Germany really wanted war, no more favourable time could have been found than during and after the Russo-Japanese War. Russia was then incapable of action, France and England inadequately equipped, and the Entente only recently founded. Had we wanted a preventive war, all the chances were in our favour then and up till 1909. The General Staff as in duty bound, called attention to that fact. But this possibility was never even considered by our Government and even in 1909, when Austria was considering an invasion of Serbia it worked consistently for peace. Perhaps it would have been wiser to attack boldly then. In spite of all the sounding words which have been spoken our policy was, in fact, too anxious and too peace-loving, rather than too militant. We never wanted to win at the expense of others, but only and always to share with them and alongside of them in the apportioning of the earth.”¹ While defending Germany against the charge of desiring war, Brandenburg admits that she made errors of judgment, of which the most serious were :

(a) supposing that France, Russia and England could never come to an agreement and that Germany therefore could continue to exploit their differences to her own advantage, by keeping them guessing ;

(b) allowing her foreign policy to be increasingly dictated by Austria-Hungary, as her last remaining ally and one whose very existence conflicted with the principles of nationality.

This defence of German policy, elaborately supported by reference to the diplomatic documents, ignores the facts that the rulers of Germany, even if they did not want war, wanted things that could only be got by war or by threat of war, or that were bound to lead to war.

First, they wanted colonial expansion—not by consent of other powers, but by force ;

Second, they insisted on international anarchy—rejecting arbitration as proposed by Britain, both at the first Hague Conference in 1899 (Brandenburg, p. 131) and at the second in 1907 (Brandenburg, p. 277) ;²

Third, they insisted on building up armaments at their own discretion—rejecting discussion of limitation at the first Hague

¹ Brandenburg, p. 518. The author on pp. 512-13 advances it as a further argument exculpating Germany that though in August, 1914, Germany was armed and equipped “as our exposed position required us always to be,” “from a diplomatic and economic point of view, practically no preparations had been made for war.” “Those who meet a great catastrophe thus unprepared scarcely can have feared it in real earnest, certainly cannot have willed it, manifestly cannot have striven for it.” To this argument the retort is simple—that Germany has always been better at war than at diplomacy or at understanding the attitude of other nations.

² In the same spirit, in July, 1914, Germany thought that “intervention by non-interested Powers between Austria and Serbia was out of the question, because that would be bringing the Austro-Serbian quarrel before the tribunal of Europe, so to speak.” (p. 490.)

Conference (Brandenburg, p. 131), at the second Hague Conference (Brandenburg, p. 276), and in direct negotiations with Britain as to their Navy. "Agreements bearing upon the limitation of our fighting strength are not to be discussed by us. A power which demands such an agreement means war with us." (Circular letter by Bülow to German ambassadors, 25th June, 1909 cited by Brandenburg, p. 281.) "A better tone towards Germany can only be obtained by a stronger fleet, downright anxiety about which brings the British to an understanding." (Kaiser on 21st August, 1911. Brandenburg, p. 396.) It is true that in the last stage of Lord Haldane's mission in 1912, Germany got nearer than before to discussing naval limitation, but only on the basis of England making a declaration of benevolent neutrality should Germany be forced into war (Brandenburg, p. 410).

In the three respects named in the last paragraph, Germany was not unique. Other countries (Japan and Italy) had colonial ambitions which they pursued by force, as the U.S.A. and Britain had extended their territory by force in earlier times. Most Governments believed in the inevitability of war and acted accordingly; according to Brandenburg, the Czar's invitation to the first peace Conference at The Hague in 1899 "roused a general feeling of bewilderment and distrust" (p. 129).¹ Austria and Russia at the second Hague Conference joined Germany in postponing discussion of disarmament; all countries armed. But the Brandenburg argument illustrated strikingly one of the main points made later: it is not enough to desire to avoid war. One must avoid also actions which lead to war and desires which can be satisfied only by war or threat of it. It illustrates also the complete and accepted immorality of international relations. Brandenburg thinks that it might have been wiser for Germany to go to war earlier, not that it would have been wrong to go to war at any time. He thinks her policy of exploiting the differences of others by keeping them guessing for her support wrong only because it was ill-judged tactically. In the immorality of international relations, however, Germany was far from being unique. Italy and Japan, to name no others among the Great Powers, were as shameless or more shameless. Britain, Russia and the United States, while showing more readiness to accept arbitration and reduce armaments, were in the last resort self-regarding and prepared to use their strength to enforce their own view of their rights.²

¹ While Governments generally were sceptical, public opinion in England, America and Italy "cordially welcomed the idea of restricting the armaments fever by means of international agreements and reducing the risk of future wars, but in Germany there were few adherents of these pacific ideas." (Brandenburg, pp. 130 and 132.)

² In his *History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World*, p. 45, Mr. Cruttwell gives three instances "in which Britain asserted the justice of her claims by ultimata, backed by a naval predominance which made armed resistance unwise if not futile. These were the disputes with Portugal over the Zambesi region (1890), with France over Fashoda (1898) and with Turkey over the Egyptian

It is unnecessary and unprofitable, at this stage in history, to measure the precise degrees of responsibility of the different nations and individuals in the events which led to the contemporary war. Any impartial study of the 24 years from the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 to the outbreak of war in 1914 shows the same principal features, shows all the powers of Europe manœuvring for safety, in mutual distrust and fear, based on consciousness of self-seeking as the sole motive of international affairs. "In the reports of the Belgian Embassy we see how pessimistic was the outlook of the statesmen of the eighties regarding the European situation, how they considered the outbreak of war as possible at any moment, and peace as certain only for a matter of weeks or months."¹ In the first half of this period, Britain feared most Russia (in the East and India) and France (in Africa) and twice formally sought alliance with Germany (in 1898 and 1901). Germany held back, making it a condition that Britain should join the Triple Alliance, and thus involve herself with the Austro-Russian conflict; thinking that the gap between Britain and the Dual Alliance was unbridgeable, and therefore, that Germany could do best for herself by selling her support for compensations without committing herself. "Everything now depends on neither discouraging the English nor letting ourselves be captured by them prematurely." The threatened understanding with the Dual Alliance was simply "a hideous spectre invented to terrify us" (Bülow to Kaiser 21st January, 1901, cited by Brandenburg, p. 157.) In the second half of the period, Britain came to fear Germany most through Germany's colonial ambitions and naval programme, composed her differences with France, and moved over to the Dual Alliance.

It is probably fair to say that before 1914 neither Britain nor Germany wanted war, but:

(i) each through fear united herself for safety with other countries and became involved in their quarrels. German policy came to be dictated by Austria; Britain's policy came to be deeply influenced by France. "It is a fact that the relations between Great Britain and Germany were never better than on the eve of the war, which arose from troubles entirely outside our relations with the German Government;"²

(ii) each pursued aims involving risk of war. Britain was committed to maintaining her overseas empire and joined in the partitioning of the

frontier in the Sinai Peninsula (1906)." He adds that "Lord Salisbury, who was responsible for the enforcement of Britain's claims in the two former instances, showed a real spirit of conciliation when once the foreign claim had been withdrawn. A portion of the contested area was restored to Portugal in 1891 as an act of grace, and France "was given a generous extension of undisputed influence in Central Africa."

¹ Brandenburg, pp. 17-18.

² Churchill *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 163, July, 1934.

world. Germany claimed to share in land-grabbing and was not content to be merely the strongest land power.

Brandenburg's scholarly volume illustrates on every page the main generalization made by Mr. J. A. Spender in his review of the same period :

"It is difficult to think of any period in history which is so definitely rounded off as the expression of one governing idea as the period dealt with in this book [1870-1914]. In its endeavour to balance power against power, to find security in an equilibrium of power, to solve all problems by reference to power, to exclude the common morality and what in common parlance are called the rights and wrongs, from the sphere of power—in all this it seems to me unique in history. Other nations have at other times and for a longer or shorter period acted on these principles, but never did groups of nations practise them with the same consistency and continuity as in the forty years before the war. Never was there so complete and candid an avowal that the private and the public morality are of a different order, and that the public morality which repudiates the private has the superior claim."¹

Mr. Ensor puts a larger share of blame for the outbreak of the first World War upon Germany.

"The disaster which had befallen Europe had its roots since 1870 in the giant expansion and uncontrolled ambition of the new Germany. Bismarck had sown the seed, through his memorable triumphs for militarism and unscrupulous efficiency; but between 1871 and 1890 he was careful not to water it. After his fall it grew apace, unchecked by the Statesmen and encouraged by the Emperor."

But Mr. Ensor, like others, sees a deeper cause of war than the ambitions of any one power. To admit the megalomania of Germany "is not to imply that the world's peace would have been assured, could any single Power have been eliminated from its reckonings. Mankind lived under a system of 'international anarchy,' of which more than one Power from time to time tried to take aggressive advantage."²

All unbiased studies of the years before 1914 lead to conclusions such as those stated briefly by British writers like Mr. G. P. Gooch and Lord Lothian :

¹ *Fifty Years of Europe*, p. 418. Mr. Spender continues : "I think it may be said without cant that among the mass of documents the British strike their own note in their appeal to the common ideas of right and wrong, and their observance of the candour and rectitude which would be expected in the dealings of private individuals, and an Englishman may reasonably take some pride in that. But to the rest of the world this was either hypocrisy or mere unacquaintance, to be expected from the Islanders, with the technique of European diplomacy."

² Ensor *op. cit.*, pp. 495-96.

"The war was the child of the European anarchy, of the outworn system of sovereign states."¹

"I am not attempting to assess relative responsibility in the acts which preceded the war of 1914. The question is irrelevant. On either view the ultimate cause of the war was the European anarchy in which every state had to depend upon its own arms or its Alliances for its security, and it was nobody's business to think of Europe as a whole."²

The fighting which began in 1914 ceased on 11th November, 1918. The victors set out to think not only of Europe but of the World as a whole and to lay the foundations of a lasting universal peace. The next stage in learning from the experience of the past is to examine the failure of the settlement attempted at Versailles.

THE FAILURE OF THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT

"It is comparatively easy," wrote Mr. Lloyd George in a famous memorandum prepared during the Versailles Conference,³ "to patch up a peace which will last for thirty years." The Peace made in 1919 did not last nearly so long. Two members of the League of Nations—Japan and China—were at war in 1931; open war between two other members—Italy and Ethiopia—began in 1935; war became general in Europe in 1939. Obviously this was merely a resumption of the old war. Why did the victors of 1918, to all appearance omnipotent, fail so completely in an "easy" task? The answer is simple: first, that the victors were not sufficiently united; second, that the instrument of lasting peace forged at Versailles—namely the League of Nations—was inadequate for its purpose.⁴

¹ G. P. Gooch, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy* (Longmans Green, 4th Edition, 1940), p. 470.

² Lothian *Pacifism is not Enough (nor Patriotism Either)* p. 23 (Oxford University Press, 1935).

³ *Some Considerations for the Peace Conference Before They Finally Draft their Terms.* The memorandum dated 25th March, 1919, was prepared by Mr. Lloyd George and a small group of advisers (including General Smuts and Lord Lothian) in the seclusion of the Forest of Fontainebleau, in order to define the limits to which the British Delegation could go to meet the French view. It is printed nearly in full by its author in *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, pp. 404-16. It is referred to below as the "Fontainebleau Memorandum."

⁴ The failure of the Versailles Settlement has been explained from many different points of view in many books. The most convenient scholarly account of the period between the wars is that given in *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1939* by G. M. Gathorne-Hardy (Oxford University Press—Third Edition, 1941). Other works cited or used here include two volumes of speeches by Winston Churchill—*Arms and the Covenant* (Harrap, 1938) and *Step by Step* (Thornton Butterworth, 1939); *The Lost Peace* by Harold Butler (Faber and Faber, 1941); *The Twenty Years Crisis* by E. H. Carr (Macmillan, 1939); *Peace-making*, 1919 by Harold Nicolson (Constable, 1933, reprinted with a new introduc-

DISUNITY OF VICTORS

To begin with, the victors of 1918 were not even all formally Allies. They were European Allies with whom the United States was associated, and of whom the President of the United States was almost as critical as he was of the enemy or of the Republican Party in his own country. "I know that Europe is still governed by the same reactionary forces which controlled this country until a few years ago."¹ "England and France have not the same view with regard to the peace that we have by any means."² "It is certain that too much success or security on the part of the Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult if not impossible."³ "They need to be co-erced."⁴ And in fact they were co-erced, by the threat of the United States concluding a separate peace, into accepting the Fourteen Points, subject to two published reservations, as the basis of peace with Germany.⁵ They did so in the light of an "Interpretation" of the Fourteen Points and the other Principles laid down by the President, which was made by Colonel House and cabled to the President for his approval on 29th October, 1918. This "Interpretation" was a vital document, going far to explain away some of the Points and Principles, but was never communicated to the Germans. As Mr. Harold Nicolson says, "It is difficult to resist the impression that the Enemy Powers accepted the Fourteen Points as they stood; whereas the Allied Powers accepted them only as interpreted by Colonel House at the meeting which culminated in his cable of October 29th. Somewhere, amid the hurried and anxious imprecisions of those October days, lurks the explanation of the fundamental misunderstanding which has since arisen."⁶

The misunderstandings which clouded the initiation of the Peace Conference are important in their effect on the German attitude to the Versailles Settlement, as something won by trickery. The substantial cause of the failure lay not there, but in the disunity of the powers opposed to Germany, and their lack of effective will to establish an enduring peace. Of the five Great Powers opposed to Germany two had no

tion, 1944); *Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918-1939* by W. M. Jordan (Oxford University Press, 1943); *World in Trance* by Leopold Schwarzschild (Hamish Hamilton, 1943); *The Mirror of the Past* by K. Zilliacus (Gollancz, 1944); *Public Opinion and the Last Peace* by R. B. McCallum (Oxford University Press, 1944).

¹ Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, vol. viii, p. 235.

² *Ibid.*, vol. vii, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 523.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vii, p. 500.

⁵ The Fourteen Points with the Four Principles and the Five Particulars making twenty-three in all, were laid down in the first instance by the President without consulting the Allies and the negotiation on them with the German Government between 3rd and 29th October, was conducted without reference to them. The Fourteen Points are printed in the Appendix, p. 103.

⁶ Nicolson, *op. cit.* p. 16.

such desire at all. In Mr. Harold Nicolson's phrase, "Japan and Italy were frankly out for loot."¹ The other three—the United States, France and Britain—did genuinely above all things desire peace and security, but they had conflicting conceptions as to the means by which this security could be achieved. "The Americans, and to some extent the British, imagined that peace could be founded upon the reasonableness of democratic institutions: the French believed that it could only be achieved by concrete guarantees against any future German aggression."² The difference between the British outlook and the American outlook as presented by President Wilson was in essentials slight. The speech made by Mr. Lloyd George on 5th January, 1918,³ three days before the announcement of the Fourteen Points, is as Wilsonian as anything that Wilson ever said: "Government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in the war" . . . "a great attempt must be made to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes" . . . "equality of right among nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country is fighting to establish in this war." On other occasions Mr. Lloyd George expressed as emphatically the same belief as Wilson in democracy as a guarantee of peace and in the need for disarmament all round. "Democracy is itself a guarantee of peace, and if you cannot get it in Germany, then we must secure other guarantees as a substitute."⁴ "To my mind it is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation of armaments upon Germany unless we are prepared to impose a limitation upon ourselves. Unless we secure this permanent limitation we shall achieve neither lasting peace, nor the permanent observance of the limitation of German armaments which we now seek to impose."⁵

On some specific questions—such as the right of blockade in war, reparations and the treatment of German colonies—the British representatives at Versailles had their special standpoint and succeeded in persuading Wilson to agreement. But as to the main principles on which peace should be founded there was never any real difference between the British views and those of Wilson. Mr. Jordan cites the remark of an American writer than to continental observers "nothing was more amazing than the hold which Wilsonian principles were able to gain on public opinion throughout the British Isles and the Dominions" in the post-war years. He gives the reasonable explanation that "Great Britain was the home of Wilsonian

¹ Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

² *Ibid.*, p. xi.

³ The quotations are taken from *Documents and Statements relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims December, 1916—November, 1918*, with an introduction by G. Lowes Dickinson.

⁴ Cited by Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁵ Fontainebleau Memorandum of 25th March, 1919 in *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*.

idealism." "The idealism which inspired the Allied cause in the Great War of 1914-18, was in the first instance the achievement of British Liberalism."¹ Mr. R. B. McCallum puts the same point in citing a journalist's description of Wilson as "Gladstone with an American accent."² "The League," he says elsewhere, "was just as much an English as an American idea."³

Unfortunately, the three victors of 1918 who really wanted security soon became two. Wilson failed in his own country; by declining to ratify either the Versailles Treaty or the Anglo-American guarantee to France, the United States shed all responsibility in Europe and treated the war, so far as possible, as something in which she had never taken part. France and Britain were left with responsibility for a treaty embodying the greed of Italy and Japan, the idealism of Wilson, and their own conflicting views as to the way to peace and security.

This disunity between France and Britain proved the last fatal weakness in the structure erected at Versailles. The difference is expressed by Mr. W. M. Jordan in the most general terms by saying that the French believed in coercion and the British in consent as the mainstay of European peace. "The French were deeply conscious that the European settlement would certainly be shaken, and possibly overthrown, as soon as the distribution of power in which it was rooted was modified. Their principal anxiety was to ensure the retention of preponderant power by the upholders of the newly established order. The British, by contrast, were imbued with a conviction of the inevitable fragility in any settlement dependent for its preservation on the backing of superior force. Their inclination was to consent to a process of modification in the search for some permanent basis of friendly understanding."⁴ The practical result of this disunity was that the Treaty was neither modified honourably as the British desired nor enforced as the French desired. The British felt guilty about the discriminations against Germany; the German claim at the Disarmament Conference of 1932 for equality of arms with France was supported by journals of all shades of opinion from *The Times* to the *New Statesman*; a delegation of churchmen headed by the Archbishop of Canterbury in

¹ Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

² *Public Opinion and the Last Peace* by R. B. McCallum (Oxford University Press, 1944) p. 8.

³ *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁴ *op. cit.* p. 1. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the British attitude represented in part a feeling much less worthy than sense of justice, that is to say a return to self-regarding isolationism. The consideration which ultimately ranged Britain against Germany before 1914 was fear of the German fleet. With the destruction of that fleet, Britain returned in part at least to isolationism and shedding of responsibilities for Europe. Her self-regarding pre-occupation with naval power was shown later in one of her least defensible actions of the thirties, the making of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, throwing over the Versailles Treaty without reference to any other party.

October, 1932 demanded for Germany "a place of equality among other nations."¹

The French—apart from the Ruhr invasion—for one reason or another never felt able to act alone. The treaty was abrogated by Germany as soon as in defiance of the disarmament clauses she had grown strong enough to do this. Re-armament, militarisation of the Rhineland, annexation of Austria, all were accepted and condoned, till in the words of Mr. Churchill the position was reached that "now the victors are the vanquished and those who threw down their arms and sued for an armistice are striding on to world mastery. That is the position—that is the terrible transformation that has taken place bit by bit."²

In retrospect it is clear that France and Britain were both right and both wrong, right in what they affirmed and wrong in what they denied. Peace and security cannot be maintained by force alone or by justice alone. There must be both justice and force. The British mistake was in the short run the more serious; it allowed Germany to re-arm and fresh total war to desolate the world with almost incredible speed. In the long run, the British insistence on justice and the possibility of revising treaties must be regarded as indispensable for enduring peace.

The important thing today is not to distribute blame for past failures but to profit by their experience, and, in determining to profit by experience, to discard baseless pessimism. The failure of the Versailles settlement proves nothing against the possibility of making peace lasting for all mankind. It was the first attempt of its kind. It was made with insufficient previous agreement of the victorious nations, and without agreement as to aims or as to methods being reached during its preparation. It had embedded in it some things which could be described as injustices, but far more important than this was the inadequacy of the machinery provided, on the one hand for examination of alleged injustice and impartial determination of justice and, on the other hand, for provision of force to maintain justice when justice was determined.

¹ See Jordan, pp. 149-50 and Schwarzschild, pp. 210-11 for these various proceedings. In addition to the demonstrations of popular sentiment mentioned here, Mr. Schwarzschild states that Mr. Attlee on behalf of the Labour Party moved in Parliament for the complete abolition of all military clauses of the peace treaty, but this appears to be a mistake; I have not been able to trace any such motion. Mr. Winston Churchill, though he was still at this time inclined to isolationism (see speech of 14th March, 1933 in *Arms and the Covenant*, pp. 54-5) took a strong line against this popular sentiment. "They [the Germans] demand equality in weapons and equality in the organisation of the armies and fleets and we have been told, 'You cannot keep so great a nation in an inferior position. What others have they must have.' I have never agreed . . . Nothing in this life is eternal, of course, but so soon as Germany acquires full military equality with her neighbours while her own grievances are still unredressed and while she is in the temper we have unhappily seen, so surely should we see ourselves within measurable distance of a general European war." (*Arms and the Covenant*, p. 81, April, 1939).

² Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 465, March, 1938.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was a noble conception but not sufficient for the purpose of those who conceived it.

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE COVENANT

In unsettled societies the individual relies upon his own strength for his security ; each pioneer carries his musket. At a later stage, he may supplement this by arrangements with particular neighbours for mutual support and defence. Later still comes the standing arrangement by which all members of a community agree beforehand to use their personal force in defence of any one of them and in punishment of a wrong-doer. Last of all comes the organisation of a permanent police force belonging to no individual and acting only on communal authority. Provision for individual security passes through four stages of self-defence, alliance, hue and cry, and the policeman. Before the war of 1914-18 provision for the security of nations had not passed beyond the first or second of these four stages : each nation relied on its own arms or sought to supplement them by alliance with particular neighbours. The war of 1914-18 was or should have been a convincing demonstration of the inadequacy and danger of these methods. It was so far convincing that it led to a serious attempt to pass beyond them to the third stage. The Covenant of the League of Nations was an experiment in adapting to international relations the method of hue and cry ; it was designed, among other things, to provide collective security based on the armaments of individual nations. The various wars which began in the nineteen-thirties and led to the renewal of general war in 1939 leave no doubt of the inadequacy of this device. It is essential to learn and to profit by the lessons of this failure.

In the first place, the authors of the Covenant trusted unduly to the compelling power upon nations of opinion among other nations. They spoke of public opinion as a force greater than any armaments. "By far the strongest weapon we have is the weapon of public opinion." "What we rely upon is public opinion. . . and if we are wrong about it then the whole thing is wrong." These were the words of Lord Cecil in 1919 and 1923. "The League," declared the official British commentary, "must continue to depend on the free consent, in the last resort, of its component states ; this assumption is evident in nearly every article of the Covenant of which the ultimate and most effective sanction must be the public opinion of the civilised world."¹ Experience has shown that in international affairs public opinion is singularly ineffective ; ² nations can

¹ *The Covenant of the League of Nations with a Commentary Thereon* Cmd. 151, p. 12, cited by E. H. Carr *The Twenty Years Crisis*, who in the same place gives the reference to Lord Cecil's observations (pp. 46-47).

² "Moral disapproval, when it becomes the disapproval of the whole world, takes on a significance hitherto unknown in international law." The hope, thus expressed by the United States Government in January, 1933, that the unanimous resolution of the United States and of the League not to recognise Japanese conquests in Manchuria, would influence Japanese action was notoriously defeated.

isolate themselves from the opinion of other nations, as individuals cannot isolate themselves from the opinion of their fellow-citizens. Experience has put it beyond question that in international affairs: "The scales of Justice are vain without her sword."¹

In the second place, reliance upon individual nations to provide force for collective security by their own free will on each occasion and from national resources had three bad consequences:

(i) The power at the command of justice could not be great without making great also the power that might challenge justice. Potential wrong-doers had to carry the weapons for police-work.

(ii) The policies of disarmament and collective security came into conflict. Any of the major Powers—Britain or another—which implemented the third of the Fourteen Points and reduced its armaments to "the lowest level consistent with domestic safety," unfitted itself thereby to be the sword of justice.

(iii) The claims of justice and the national policies of states came into conflict. No state could be expected freely to provide its national force to carry through a decision contrary to its own interests or in a way involving it in a war unpopular with its own nationals. War as such was highly unpopular with the people of the states most devoted to the League of Nations—including Britain, France and the smaller European Powers. Other nations frankly took the view that they could not fairly be asked to supply force to help others when their own danger appeared to be small. The Geneva Protocol of 1924, the most serious attempt made at any time to "put teeth into the League," though recommended unanimously by the League Assembly in that year, perished in the following year, largely through the opposition of Britain (whose Government had changed from Labour to Conservative in the interval) and of the British Dominions, whose objections were summed up by the Canadian delegate, Senator Dandurand, as follows: "In this association of mutual insurance against fire, the risks assumed by the different States are not equal. We live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable material."²

TWO LESSONS NOT ONE FROM FAILURE

The decisive cause for the almost immediate failure of the Versailles Settlement is the disunity of the victors. One way of putting this is to say

¹ Winston Churchill in *Step by Step*, p. 38.

² Cited by Harold Butler: *The Lost Peace*, p. 34. The Geneva Protocol of 1924 contained an automatic definition of an "aggressor" as a state which refused to submit any matter in dispute to a new procedure for pacific settlement under the direction of the Council of the League. Should a country be declared guilty of aggression, every member state would be obliged to take action against it not only by financial and economic pressure, but also by military force "in the degree which its geographical situation and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." The rejection of this Protocol in 1925 is described by Harold Butler as without doubt the first turning-point at which the League turned downhill instead of up.

that though Germany undoubtedly lost the war, no one really won it, and Germany finally persuaded herself that she had not lost it.¹ The difference of general outlook between France and Britain that has been noted already appeared in relation to the League. The French sought to make certain of security in war. The British more hopefully aimed at security from war. The French, therefore, always wanted to have teeth in the League of Nations. The British argued that "anything which fosters the idea that the main business of the League is with war rather than with peace is likely to weaken it in its fundamental task of diminishing the causes of war."² The importance of maintaining a concerted policy for peace after the fighting ends is the first lesson to be learned from that failure. But there are vital lessons to be learned also from the experience of the League of Nations. In the last resort it is fair to say that the League of Nations failed because it preserved too completely the international anarchy which it was framed to supersede. It left every nation as the final judge on everything—as to its own rights, as to whether or not it would supply force for sanctions, as to whether or not it would use its own force for itself. The Covenant did not forbid resort to war altogether, but only before the pacific procedure laid down in the Covenant had been used.³ The total renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, which is often attributed to the Covenant, did not take place till the Pact of Paris of 1928.

It is clear that, in spite of the experience of 1914-18, most of the nations in 1919 were not prepared for anything stronger than the Covenant; it is arguable that none of them was. This is admitted frankly by Lord Lothian "I was at the Peace Conference and know that nothing else [than the Covenant] was possible."⁴ The "root trouble of the League" in Mr. Butler's words, was that: "Public opinion was not educated to its necessity. The terrible argument of the Great War had

¹ On the return of the Guard regiment to Berlin on 11th December, 1918, Ebert, the President of the new German Republic made a speech celebrating the return of our "undefeated army." See Schwarzschild, *op. cit.*, p. 42

² Declaration of H.M. Government on the Geneva Protocol cited by Jordan, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

³ This is pointed out by Lord Lothian, *op. cit.*, p. 25 and by Lord Robert Cecil in his Encyclopædia Britannica article on the League of Nations (vol. 31, p. 738 c.). Mr. Stephen Bonsal in *Unfinished Business*, p. 36 (Michael Joseph, 1944), describes Lord Robert Cecil as opposing insertion in the Covenant of the League of Nations of a provision for compulsory arbitration with the following words: "I hate to be a stumbling block to the realisation of a dream, a world without war, which I confess exerts a strong appeal upon me. But in the present situation it would be far from wise if we allowed our hands to be tied; they must be free to fight for the right as we see it. We are ready for very drastic restrictions. . . . And we are willing to accept delays, during which frayed tempers might be restored to normal, but in the end, if other more civilized methods fail, we must have the right to seek the arbitrament of arms." Mr. Bonsal adds in regard to the proposal for compulsory arbitration that "all the minor powers who have heard of it support the idea enthusiastically."

⁴ Lothian, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

carried conviction for the moment, but the consequences of that argument when pressed to its logical conclusion were too revolutionary to be easily assimilated by the man in the street. . . . The charge which lies against the statesmen who spoke glowingly at Geneva of the 'League spirit' and the new era which it portended is that with a limited number of honourable exceptions they did nothing to educate their national opinion when they got home. . . . Mr. Churchill was almost alone in preaching from 1933 onwards the dual policy of 'arm and stand by the Covenant.' . . . But his words fell on deaf ears in the great democracies of the West. They were not echoed by any of their party leaders."¹

In citing this judgment of Mr. Butler, it is fair to point out that in its condemnation of all party leaders, it is too sweeping. Mr. Churchill, though incomparably the strongest proponent of Arms and the Covenant, did not stand alone in the fatal years from 1931 onwards. The Labour Party had their pacifists, a general dislike of arms, and a desire to revise the Versailles Treaty, but as a party they became whole-hearted supporters of collective security through the League of Nations; their leaders, notably Mr. Attlee and Mr. Arthur Henderson, made it clear that they were prepared to supply and to use force for this purpose. The leaders of the Liberal Party were equally determined proponents of collective security and of the measures needed to maintain it. In supporting an amendment to the address moved by Mr. Churchill in November, 1934, Sir Archibald Sinclair pointed out that the world had so shrunk that—

"the outbreak of war between any two great Powers would undoubtedly, inevitably lead to a world-wide conflagration from which no country, and least of all a country like Britain with possessions in every part of the globe and trade relations with every country of the world, could be immune. Consequently, our only hope of preventing this country from being overwhelmed in the catastrophe of war is to prevent war from breaking out anywhere. From this it follows that we must be faithful to our international responsibilities for the preservation of peace and be prepared to play our part in resisting aggression."

* * * * *

"Unless at this stage in the development of the world we are able to play an effective part in resisting aggression, we shall not be able to secure and establish the rule of law in international relations.

For Britain to adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament would be to rejoice the hearts and play into the hands of tyrants and dictators and general staffs all over the world. If we do not want to leave our destinies of the world in the hands of dictators, it is by the possession of force that we must prevent and deter them from using force."

This notable speech by the Liberal Leader, exactly in Mr. Churchill's

¹ *The Lost Peace*, pp. 35-37. Mr. Churchill's unique position and services in this period are rightly summed up in the *World in Trance* by Leopold Schwarzschild, p. 274: "In an erring world he had not erred on any essential

vein, was followed by a consistent policy of Liberal support for arming in defence of the Covenant. The evidence for this is set out by Mr. (now Sir) Geoffrey Mander in *We Were Not All Wrong*,¹ a book which, in refuting the charge that the Labour and Liberal leaders and parties were unrealistic dreamers, makes clear the issue which united them with Mr. Churchill and divided them from the main body of the Conservatives. This was the issue between collective security on one hand and outworn conceptions of national defence and self-regarding national policy on the other hand.

It is natural that Mr. Butler, from the standpoint of Geneva, should judge the democracies of the West by the men who came to speak for them at Geneva. But, as he is too sweeping in his condemnation of all the party leaders, at least in Britain, so he is hardly just to the British people. "No country," he says, "when it came to the point was ready to pledge the lives of its soldiers and sailors 'in other nations' quarrels'"² This is not true of the British. As the Peace Ballot conducted by the League of Nations Union in 1935 shows, an overwhelming majority of British people—three to one among 9,000,000 odd who voted—were prepared to join in military measures to assist a victim of aggression, that is to say to fight under the League of Nations in other nations' quarrels.³

The War of 1914-18 had shown that a radical change in international relations was needed to allow any nation to be secure. No nation could be safe by its own arms or by alliances. Collective security was the only escape from war, but acceptance of the obligations of collective security involved a break with deeply rooted traditions; the revolutionary period in the world's history heralded by the first total war, called for

¹ First published in 1941 (Gollancz). Sir Geoffrey Mander disposes effectively of the charge that in voting against service estimates, as the Labour Party did till 1937 and the Liberal Party did in 1934 but never thereafter, these parties were resisting adequate armament. (See pp. 18-21 and p. 43.)

² Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Mr. Butler was at Geneva, finally as Director of the International Labour Office, from 1919 to 1938.

³ The votes on the various questions put in the Peace Ballot are given by Sir Geoffrey Mander, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-100. Sir Geoffrey cites also a number of resolutions passed by the League of Nations Union to show the practical attitude of those whom their opponents dismissed as Utopian dreamers. One such resolution, on June, 1933, runs: "The General Council considers it indispensable that, in order to establish public confidence in the efficacy of the Disarmament Treaty the Permanent Disarmament Commission, which is to supervise the execution of the Treaty, should be charged with the duty of regular untrammelled investigation in each country" (*op. cit.*, p. 78). There is here no wishful thinking, no suggestion that we should rely upon the promises or the goodwill of other nations.

This Resolution may fitly be contrasted with another statement of a very different kind, also quoted by Sir Geoffrey Mander. (*op. cit.*, pp. 105-06). In speaking of the Munich Agreement, Mr. Chamberlain as Prime Minister said: 'I believe there are many who will feel with me that such a declaration, signed by the German Chancellor and myself, is something more than a pious expression of opinion. In our relations with other countries everything depends upon their being sincerity and goodwill on both sides. I believe there is sincerity and goodwill on both sides in this declaration.' Who were the realists of the thirties in Britain and who were the idle dreamers?

radical measures. The British people were not blind to this, but their Parliament was. It was one of the misfortunes even more of the world than of Britain between the wars that the course of domestic politics in Britain, with the rise of the Labour Party competing with the Liberal Party under an electoral system disastrous to both, threw effective power for all the critical period into the hands of a party which was Conservative,¹ even more in international than in national affairs; which clung to self-regarding isolationism² and national armaments, and was half-hearted about the League. For reasons largely irrelevant to international affairs, Mr. Churchill and those with him were always in a hopeless minority in Parliament from 1931 to 1939.

Nothing more than the League might have been possible in 1919. But even the League was not tried. "While the Labour Party progressed though by a circuitous route, to the whole-hearted advocacy of collective security, successive British Governments of Conservative composition remained, save for the Abyssinian episode, consistent in their deprecation of any emphasis on the co-ercive functions of the League. Their attitude signified not merely a refusal to advance to the position of the Geneva Protocol but even a retreat from the position of the Covenant."³

Nothing stronger than the League might have been possible in 1919. This does not alter the fact that for prevention of war something stronger is required. There are two lessons, not one, to be drawn from the failure of Versailles. It will not be sufficient for the victors this time to be and to continue more united than those of 1918. They must be united for something that will replace international anarchy by the rule of law among nations. They must outlaw war for a national purpose completely and effectively. They must realise that the rule of law rests on force—overwhelming in amount, certain and speedy in action—guided by justice which in itself disregards force.

¹ At every one of the six General Elections from 1922 to 1935, the Conservative Party won a larger proportion—usually a much larger proportion—of the seats in Parliament than it polled of the votes cast. On three out of the four occasions when the Conservatives won a clear majority of all the seats in Parliament (1922, 1924, 1935) they polled less than half the votes cast. Only in 1931 did the Conservatives poll more than half the votes cast (55%) and on that occasion they won 77% of the seats. But no place was found for Mr. Churchill in that or any subsequent administration up to the outbreak of war.

² Sir John Simon's remark as Foreign Secretary, in a debate of 27th February, 1933, on Japanese aggression, is famous; "I am myself enough of a pacifist to take this view that however we handle this matter I do not intend my own country to get into trouble about it."

³ Jordan, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-09.

THE SOIL AND THE SEEDS OF WAR

International anarchy is the general condition making war possible and likely. But anarchy—the absence of law—is not in itself a state of war. What are the specific causes that, working on this general condition, bring about open war? It will be sufficient here to examine six factors which are commonly named as the causes of war. They are the natural pugnacity of mankind; the economic system, or economic conditions; the special wickedness of Germans; the ambition of rulers: revenge; and fear.

NATURAL PUGNACITY OF MANKIND

Whatever be said about earlier wars, an assertion that the contemporary war is due to desire for it by any appreciable proportion of mankind is too foolish to require lengthy refutation. As it is put by Mr. Harold Nicolson, the real problem is to account for the fact “that a world which, by a vast majority, was a pacific world, was plunged against its will into the widest and most intense war in history.”¹ It is safe to say that, with a few lunatic exceptions, all men in all lands desire peace; the exceptions are becoming less significant in numbers and more obviously lunatic, with each additional day of experience of total war. Man is a greedy, self-regarding animal moved largely by irrational impulses, but he is not a “fighting animal” now that fighting means total war. Man is not so irrational or so inhuman as to desire either to organise or to suffer mass-killing by high explosive, fire, gas and famine. He fights today unwillingly, as is shown both by the universal substitution of conscription for volunteering and use of mercenaries in modern wars, and by the reluctance of every nation to go to war until it feels forced to do so.² This reluctance lay at the root of the failure of the League of Nations:

“What is the human nature of ordinary decent nations, those who for the time being and in a given case are ordinary decent nations? History teaches us that their consistent instinct is to take to their heels [as the ordinary citizen does when he sees criminals attacking a stranger]. The simple fact that almost all the wars of the past were duels proves this. Even in the case of the great conquerors, from Darius and Xerxes to Napoleon, who obviously threatened everyone, it took a long time and many laborious efforts to create coalitions

¹ *op. cit.*, p. 8.

² The Irish are almost proverbially pugnacious. They have been practically unanimous in keeping out of the contemporary war. The Turks are proverbially Turks. They also kept out of the contemporary war till it was practically over, in spite of strong pressure to enter it on the side of the United Nations and they abandoned economic neutrality only when the end was so near and certain that their action involved no risk of having to fight.

against them. The coalitions were always preceded by wars of the conqueror against one single victim after another, in which those who were not attacked had always shunned participation. Whenever they were free to choose, nations have avoided wars more often than they have waged them.”¹

ECONOMIC SYSTEM OR CONDITIONS

Explanations of war as due fundamentally to economic causes fall into two main classes. In one class of explanation, the blame for war is laid on a particular system for the production or distribution of wealth ; the commonest scapegoats are capitalism or high finance. In the other class of explanation, blame is laid on the inequality of economic conditions between different nations ; war is presented as in essence an attempt by the “have-nots” among nations to enrich themselves by attacking the “haves.”

Several distinct though related theories of the first class, attributing war to even economic causes such as underconsumption or pressure of finance capital seeking outlets for investment, are examined in a volume by Professor Lionel Robbins published shortly before the present war.² The result is to show that none of the theories fit the main facts of the period from 1870 to 1914. There have been cases in which a strong state has used for some economic purpose its power of bullying a small state. The South African War of 1899-1901 is probably a case in point, gloriously redeemed by the peace settlement of 1908. But “in the relations either direct or indirect between strong states there is hardly any evidence of the influence of finance being used in a direction conducive to friction or war. There is hardly any evidence that high finance was an initiating factor in the complicated manœuvres of balance of power diplomacy.” Against this absence of evidence of an active role on the part of high finance, Professor Robbins finds abundant evidence of passive instrumentality. “We do not find evidence that finance was often a prime mover. But there is plenty of evidence that finance was used continually as a pawn.”³ This is a special aspect of a point made more generally by Mr. R. G. Hawtrey that, under international anarchy, states seek to improve their economic position not for the economic purpose of welfare but for the political purpose of power. “The economic ambitions of States are . . . expressed in terms of power So long as welfare is the end, different communities may co-operate happily together. Jealousy there may be and disputes as to how the material means of welfare should be shared. But there is no inherent divergence of aim in the pursuit of welfare. Power on the other hand is relative. The gain of one country is necessarily loss

¹ Schwarzschild : *World in Trance*, p. 54.

² *The Economic Causes of War* by Lionel Robbins. (Jonathan Cape, 1939).

³ Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

to others ; its loss is gain to them. Conflict is of the essence of pursuit of power." ¹ Economic power is a form of power. The principal part played by economics in war is that of an instrument rather than a cause.

Explanations of the second class, attributing war, not to a particular economic system, whether capitalism or another, but to differences of economic conditions in different countries may take several forms. It is said, for instance, that great inequality of standards of living in different countries may lead to war, through desire of the poorer nations to share the wealth of the richer nations. Whatever importance this motive of plunder may have had in the past, it is difficult to regard it as important today. The contemporary World War is in the main a conflict between nations with relatively high standards of life. For this there is the good reason that modern war is a highly capitalised and industrialised undertaking. A nation with a low standard of living is one with a low output per head. It is most unlikely to have any chance of success in war against a more highly industrialised nation.

It is said, again, that economic conditions in another form—that of excessive density of population—are a cause of war. Actually the most conspicuous of the "unsatisfied" powers in Europe, namely Germany, had a much lower density of population than Britain, Belgium or Holland. The decline of the birth-rate was affecting her with all the rest of Western Europe before the first World War and between the wars had reached a point threatening a decline of the total population. The measures taken by both the German and the Italian dictators to raise the birth-rate expose the insincerity of their demand for additional living room. If we look to Asia, we find Japan with a high density of population but at the same time with a higher standard of life than China—the country into which she sought to expand. Density of population, like desire for colonies, is a pretext for war by ambitious rulers, rather than in itself a cause of war.

In relation to the contemporary War, one of the most recent and definite assertions of economic causation is made by Mr. E. H. Carr: "In retrospect it is not difficult to see that the increasing strains of competitive capitalism were one of the most important underlying causes of the catastrophe of 1914." ² It is unfortunate that this statement stands in Mr. Carr's book, which in other respects is closely reasoned, without further explanation and without indication of the evidence on which it rests. As it stands, the statement is not easy to accept.

First, the reference to "increasing strains of competitive capitalism" does not accord with the economic facts. Up to 1914 capitalism was doing reasonably well, raising the standard of living throughout the world and most conspicuously in Europe and North America which plunged into war. It is true that the economic system

¹ Hawtrey, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-7.

² *Conditions of Peace*, p. 7.

of those days produced recurrent depressions of trade, but these were slight as compared with inter-war experience, were diminishing rather than increasing in violence in Britain, and were not taken seriously in the United States. It is true also that the economic system of those days—through its central weakness of failure to generate sufficient steady demand for its products—led to a struggle for markets and this may be described as one factor in the colonial land-grabbing in which all advanced industrial nations indulged in the latter part of the 19th century. Germany's lack of colonies was put forward as a reason for going to war to get them. But it was a political rather than an economic reason. Germany never had any difficulty in trading with the colonies of other powers, getting all the raw materials she wanted and suffering little or no discrimination in them as markets; the greatest colonial power—Britain—had a universal policy of free trade. The desire for colonies in Germany's case, as in that of Italy, sprang from politics not from economics.

Second, Mr. Carr's thesis is impossible to reconcile with any careful historical account of the pre-war relations of the nations that went to war, such as is given by Professor Erich Brandenburg in his volume *From Bismarck to the World War*. All the manœuvrings of the persons who actually determined on peace and war, and decided on which side the different nations should be found, are there exposed from secret documents. In this account, the economic motive and any kind of economic consideration are conspicuously absent.

This criticism of economic explanations of war is not intended to suggest that the solution of economic problems is unimportant. It is important in itself and it is relevant to the ensuring of peace. First, where ownership of territory is combined with restrictions on trade and migration, those who do not own territory may have a real grievance. "So long as the richer Powers practise exclusion, so long can the poorer say with truth 'Our poverty is greater because of their policy. Our misery would be less if their barriers were shattered.' It is not a pleasant thought."¹ The point is put shortly in the Free Trade phrase "If goods cannot cross frontiers, armies will." The sequence is not perhaps as automatic as that. But that restrictionism breeds envy and enmity is certain. Second, a genuinely democratic form of Government, while not by itself a guarantee of peace, as was supposed at one time, makes war less likely. But a democracy which cannot solve the problem of unemployment is itself insecure. It may in despair give way to dictatorship, and the dictator may see in war a way of establishing his position, ending unem-

¹ Professor L. C. Robbins, in his contribution to the collection of lectures, edited by C. A. W. Manning on *Peaceful Change: An International Problem*, p. 58 (Macmillan, 1937). Professor Robbins points out "that it is not yet a hundred years since the Western Powers thought it justifiable to send warships and armies to the East to open up the channels of trade" and might be hard put to it to find an answer if the East attempted to follow this precedent (*op. cit.*, p. 58).

ployment and satisfying his ambitions. To make the world safe for democracy does increase the chances of its being a peaceful world, for the common man neither has nor thinks he has anything to gain by war. But the world cannot be made safe for democracy, except by showing that democracy can conquer the social evils of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness and Inequality.

The bringing about of a greater measure of prosperity throughout the world is desirable in itself and as a contribution to peace. It is true that a poor nation, if it is sensible, will seldom, if ever, suppose that it can enrich its citizens by attacking a richer nation. But nations are not always sensible. It is worth while to remove grievances as between nations by effective execution of the fourth point of the Atlantic Charter.

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect to their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

It is true again that unemployment and want are not themselves causes of war, and certainly are no justification for it. But they may give an opportunity to those who desire war. It is worth while to remove the springs of unrest in all lands by effective execution of the fifth point of the Atlantic Charter.

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security.

The argument given here is designed not to rule out economic considerations in planning for peace, but to put such considerations in their right place. Neither any particular economic system such as capitalism, nor economic inequality, can be regarded as direct or primary causes of war. It follows that we should not regard either a change of system or the achievement of economic equality as a pre-condition of peace; we should not say that, till we have made economic justice universal, we cannot hope to avoid war.

SPECIAL WICKEDNESS OF GERMANS

Undoubtedly, the Nazi Government of Germany is the most abominable that has been known in any country for hundreds of years, if not at any time in history. It has persecuted the weak, bringing back horrors and savagery which we thought had been left behind in the Middle Ages. It has multiplied and intensified those horrors by the new techniques of the totalitarian State. It has corrupted youth, training its young men "to be mad dogs"¹ and its young women to be breeders of

¹ This phrase used to him by a German to describe Nazi education is reported by Dr. Gilbert Murray, in the *Spectator*, of 8th September, 1943.

cannon fodder in or out of wedlock. It has rejected religion, learning, human kindness and tolerance.

Undoubtedly also, the fact that the German people should have handed themselves over to such a Government must be borne in mind in judging of that people. In his scholarly study of *The Roots of National Socialism 1783-1933*.¹ Mr. R. D'O Butler traces to their early historical origins in German thought all the main ideas of the Nazis, including exaltation of the heroic leader (as old as Fichte 1762-1814) assertion of might as right (Novalis 1772-1801), abasement of the individual before the State (Hegel 1770-1831), militarism (Frederick II 1712-86), super-national mission of German culture (Fichte and Novalis), demand for living space (List 1789-1846) anti-semitism (Marwitz *d.* 1837).² There were, of course, Germans who took a different line, including some of the greatest, such as Kant with his *Plan for Perpetual Peace*, cosmopolitan Goethe and his companion poet Schiller, but these were exceptions. There were Liberals and Socialists, but German Liberalism failed in 1848 and 1918, and German socialism "gradually came to be state-socialism, Prussian socialism, national-socialism."³ The line of thought leading to the Nazis has been the main line of German thought for 150 years. Mr. Butler concludes :

"National Socialism is not artificial or exotic ; it is naturally German. This indeed, is necessarily the case, for the national-socialist leaders are not for the most part men of a profound or highly original turn of mind, they are men of small education who seized hold of the ideas and prejudices which came most naturally to them and to the bulk of the German people. The Nazis could never have won the devotion of the German folk by imposing upon it a regimen wholly alien to the German outlook ; they won it, on the contrary, by calling up the German spirit from the depths."⁴

But though National-Socialism, in Mr. Butler's words, is ancient in inspiration and unoriginal in its ideals, it is "ultra-modern in technique." One of the outstanding applications of modern technique for converting millions of human beings into automatic instruments of the leader's purpose is in the training of the young. "Our State is an Educational State which does not let a man go free from the cradle to the grave. We begin with the child when he is three years old. As soon as he begins to think he is made to carry a little flag. Then follows school, the Hitler Youth, the Storm Troopers and military training. We do not

¹ Published by Faber and Faber, 1941.

² I have not been able to trace the year of birth of Ludwig Freiherr von der Marwitz but he was described as a skilful young soldier in 1807, and he opposed the Hardenberg reforms in 1811-15. By 1825 he had come to be described as the rugged old Marwitz. He was a leader of the Prussian Junkers.

³ R. Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

⁴ *op. cit.*, pp. 284-85.

let him go ; and when all that is done comes the Labour Front which takes possession of him again, and does not let him go until he dies even if he does not like it.”¹ These are the words of Dr. Ley as cited by Professor Wolf. “The German School in the Third Reich is an integral part of the National-Socialistic order of living. It has the mission, in collaboration with other phases of the Party, to fashion and mould the National-Socialistic Being according to Party orders.” This extract from the Nazi Teachers’ Manual, is quoted by Mr. Ziemer in a study of Nazi methods to which he gives the appropriate title of *Education for Death*.² This account by an American teacher of visits paid by him to all the various institutions which form the Nazi system for training mad dogs and the future mothers of mad dogs must be read to be believed. Hatred of all foreigners, fanatical devotion to a leader, ruthless stamping out of independence, brutality to the weak and contempt for the things of the spirit have been taught now for ten years and more.

How soon and by what measures it will be possible to undo this devil’s work after the military defeat of Germany is considered later. The point to make here is that there are special features about the German people which make them peculiarly dangerous to other people, which justify and require the taking of special steps to make and to keep Germany impotent for war. With the mental attitude that has made acceptance of National-Socialism natural, the German people combine a special aptitude for war, arising from their central position, large numbers and organising ability.

But the problem of ensuring peace is not simply that of keeping Germany impotent for war. The war of 1939 is only a second outbreak of the unfinished war of 1914-18, made inevitable by leaving Germany with grievances real or fancied and a motive for revenge, without taking steps to keep her impotent. “The removal of the just grievances of the vanquished ought to precede the disarmament of the victors.”³

And if we look to the years before 1914, our future enemy Germany was in every way a more civilised State than our future ally Czarist Russia—with no secret police, with a vigorous socialist and trade union movement with a high record in science, art and social service. In relation to the war of 1914-18 the case against Germany cannot be put higher than to say that she and her rulers expressed more frankly and uncompromisingly than most others the principles of lawlessness and self-seeking which in the last resort were accepted by all nations. She had the excuse for doing so that, having achieved unity and strength later than other nations, she had not been able to share in the apportionment of the earth ; it

¹ *Higher Education in Nazi Germany* by Professor A. Wolf, p. 18 (Methuen, 1944).

² *Education for Death : The Making of the Nazi* by Gregor Ziemer (Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 17.

³ Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 45, November, 1932.

was easy, she argued, for Britain, the United States and France, who by past wars had acquired vast territories, now to be virtuous and deprecate future wars: they were the privileged defenders of the *status quo*. The attitude of Germany in claiming that each state must be the final judge of its own actions, both within its territory and in relation to other states, differed only in emphasis from the attitude of other states.

Future wars will not be prevented merely by dealing with particular nations, such as the Germans or the Japanese. Within the past fifty years, Britain twice sought alliance with Germany (in 1898 and 1901) and was allied with Japan for nearly twenty years from 1902. That is to say, Britain sought the aid of these two nations against the possibility of her being at war with other nations. Short memories are dangerous.

AMBITION OF RULERS

Ambition of Rulers as a cause of war is seen not only in the glaring cases—Napoleon, Bismarck, Hitler, Mussolini. There were also in the 25 years which led up to the first World War, less conspicuous men who systematically pursued, for themselves or for their states, ambitions which were bound to lead to war.¹ There is one figure so conspicuous in connection with the War of 1914-18 as to call for passing mention. This is the Kaiser William II of Germany. The judgment passed on him by J. A. Spender is that "notwithstanding his shining armour and mailed fist, the Kaiser was an irresolute man who preferred posturing on the edge of a precipice to plunging down it." This is probably true, but if one postures often enough in dangerous places, one is certain to slip some time. The Kaiser probably did not want actual war, but he wanted things that were bound to lead to war: colonial expansion combined with a navy to challenge Britain. Germany under the Kaiser after the dismissal of Bismarck illustrates the way in which the ambition of rulers leads ultimately to war. Bismarck having unified Germany and built her up by three wars, against Denmark, Austria and France, according to Brandenburg,

¹ Among those calling for consideration here are Aehrenthal in Austria, who brought about the annexation of Bosnia; Iswolski in Russia, who stood for Pan-Slavism and sought revenge for his personal Bosnian defeat by cementing the Dual Alliance between France and Russia; Kiderlen-Wachter in Germany, with "a strain of reckless brutality and truculence in his nature" (Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, p. 360), who had much to do with the bullying of Russia in 1909 and with the Agadir crisis in 1911 (Spender, *op. cit.*, p. 331); Conrad von Hötzendorf in Austria "the most consistent and conscientious fire-eater on the European scene." (Spender, *op. cit.*, p. 286). Some would add to this list Poincaré in France, whom the German Brandenburg marks with Iswolski as one of the two men most responsible for war. But Poincaré was merely one carrier of France's spirit of revenge for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine; his place is not in this list of ambitious rulers. No Briton or American comes fairly into the list, and the time of Italy and Japan to be megalomaniac had not come. To the names of individuals in this note, it would probably be fair to add the name of an organisation—the German General Staff, masters of war, artists waiting their chance to demonstrate their artistry.

² J. A. Spender, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

"looked upon the maintenance of peace as Germany's supreme interest" thinking "that we had nothing to gain even from a victorious war in Europe."¹ But Germany's later rulers had their ambitions also; had to go one better than Bismarck and win laurels for themselves.

Ambition of Rulers as a cause of war has had its most striking manifestation of recent times, not in Europe but in the Far East. Japan, importing and exploiting the industrial methods of Europe, has set herself to a career of forcible expansion and domination. The development in Japan of new plague-spot of aggressive war is cited sometimes as an illustration of the economic causes of war. But Japanese aggression cannot be attributed to poverty. The industrialisation which has made aggression possible must have raised, in place of lowering, the standard of life in Japan. Nor can Japanese aggression be justified by need to find living room for an expanding population. Japan had a higher standard of living and not a materially greater density of population than China, the country into which she has sought to expand. Industrialisation and growth of population have not compelled aggression: they have only made aggression seem to ambitious rulers to be worth while and likely to succeed.

REVENGE

At the time of Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, there were two potential sources of major conflict in Europe: French resentment at the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans. The first of these illustrates directly the motive of revenge. The second illustrates directly not revenge but the working of fear. The Austro-Hungarian Empire lived in a perpetual state of fear, threatened herself by Serbian nationalism with Russian backing and threatening others that she might preserve herself. But the two sources of conflict, though distinct in origin, worked to the same result. Germany's fear of French revenge made her the tool of Austria, so that she might keep her last ally in Europe; this led directly to the first World War. The second World War was a continuance of the first one, set in motion equally by revenge for Versailles and by the ambition of the German tyrant. Any nation which is defeated in war, is apt to regard the defeat itself as something for which revenge must be taken when opportunity offers. Thus war tends to breed war in endless chain, unless the chain is broken by a just peace.

FEAR

The part played by fear in turning anarchy into war has been illustrated already in discussion of the coming of world war. International anarchy is not merely the general condition which makes war possible

¹ Brandenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 17 and 3.

—the soil of war in which the seeds may germinate. It contains in itself one of the most potent of the seeds of war—namely fear of war.

The nations under international anarchy are often described as living in the conditions of the jungle, with nature red in tooth and claw. But "jungle fear" understates the discomfort and danger of international relations in the past. Beasts, though they must always be watchful when abroad, can in most cases retire to safe dens for repose. Nations in an anarchic amoral world are never safe: must always be securing the latest and most destructive munitions of war, and must always be ready to shoot first. Four quotations from four writers present this picture better than any words of mine can do it.

"So long as international relations are based on force, power will be a leading object of national ambition. There results a vicious circle. When a political leader says that war is necessary in his country's vital interests, what he usually means is that war is necessary to acquire or to avoid losing some factor of national strength. The interest is only vital in the sense that it is vital to success in war. The only end vital enough to justify war is something arising out of the prospect of war itself. . . ." The principal cause of war is war itself."¹

"No one keeps armaments going for fun. They keep them going for fear."²

"Every country building up those armaments [before 1914], justified its expenditure on them . . . on the grounds that unless its armaments were increased, their country could not feel secure. . . . The result of the increase of armaments was . . . a feeling of fear. In 1914, Europe had arrived at a point in which every country except Germany was afraid of the present and Germany was afraid of the future."³

"Looking back over the whole period, what may chiefly strike us is the influence of fear in the policies of all the Powers. All under the Alliance system, lived in fear that the opposing group would be stronger than their group, and nearly all were driven to subordinate their traditional policies and interests to this dominant motive. But the grinding logic of the Alliance system presented all in the end with the simple choice of standing by their friends or sharing their downfall, and whatever sacrifice of traditional interests or policies might be required for this purpose had to be made, less a worse thing befell. There could hardly be a worse motive for ordering the affairs of a civilised world, but under the Alliance system in a world organized for

¹ R. G. Hawtrey : *Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, pp. 27 and 105.

² Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 46, November, 1932.

³ Viscount Grey in the House of Lords Debates Vol. 58 cols. 957-8 (20th July, 1924). To this statement of fear in 1914 Viscount Grey suggests that the British were an exception, trusting to being an island and assuming "that the advantages of being an island today are the same as the advantages were in the last century." This may have been true of the British public in 1914 but was hardly true of the Government: fear of Germany had brought the Government over to the Dual Alliance.

war, it was irresistible. Historians seeking for the causes of the war waste their ink when they look for it in any one series of transactions. Behind each contention were the massed nations in arms seeing in it a test of their power in which they could not afford to be worsted.¹

The nations before 1914 were like a number of men each with a gun in a dark room, each watching all the others with complete distrust, manœuvring for position, with their fingers on the trigger. In those circumstances someone is certain to start shooting some time, though all may genuinely hate shooting. One of the special points in the causation of war which is most emphasised by Lord Lothian is the destructive influence of the "military time-table"—the way in which, when war has once begun to seem possible, mutual fears drive nations headlong unwillingly over the edge of war, in order to gain the advantage of striking first or to avoid the disadvantage of being late.² "Wars do not always wait until all the combatants are ready. Sometimes they come before any are ready, sometimes when one nation thinks itself less unready than another, or when one nation thinks it is likely to become, not stronger, but weaker as time passes."³

THE CAUSES OF WAR REVIEWED.

From this examination of six possible causes of war under conditions of international anarchy two sets of conclusions emerge.

First, of all the six causes by far the most potent in modern conditions is fear. This fear is itself the product of international anarchy; it can be removed with certainty by bringing anarchy to an end, but not by any lesser change. Revenge and ambition of rulers are minor, though independent causes. The spirit of revenge is bred most powerfully of injustice; the prophylaxis against it lies in avoidance of injustice in making peace and thereafter. Against the ambition of rulers the best defence is democracy, for the common man has no ambition for war: the best—the indispensable—safeguards for democracy are material prosperity and education. Of the other causes examined, the alleged pugnacity of mankind is a myth, and the special wickedness of Germans is a difference of degree rather than of kind. Economic conditions have not in recent times been a cause of major wars, and the attribution of war to particular economic institutions, such as capitalism or socialism, is baseless. The importance of economic conditions in relation to war is real but is indirect rather than direct.

Second, none of the six causes examined is in itself a serious obstacle to establishment of the rule of law in place of international anarchy

¹ J. A. Spender, *op. cit.*, pp. 411-12.

² *Pacifism is not Enough (nor Patriotism Either)*, pp. 21-3 (Oxford University Press 1935, reprinted, 1941).

³ Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 287, March, 1936.

among nations. It is needless to argue this except in relation to economic causes. Existence of economic grievances or inequalities between individual citizens does not prevent establishment of the rule of law among them. The Government of an ordered community does not delay to prohibit robbery, violence and law-breaking until it shall have abolished all grievances and made all laws just. But it realises that maintenance of order depends in the last resort upon its acceptability. The same holds of international relations : order first and widening deepening justice later. From this discussion we gain a pointer to the main conclusion of this work. In seeking peace, the first objective must be to establish machinery for settling differences between nations otherwise than by war. The second objective is to diminish grievances, injustice and miseries which otherwise may sooner or later strain the machinery beyond its strength.

SOME FALSE TRAILS TO PEACE

Before setting out a programme for establishing lasting peace, it may be convenient to name some things which must be avoided. They include power politics, refusal of international commitments, balance of power, unchangeable frontiers, impoverishment or dismemberment of Germany, permanent differentiation between nations.

POWER POLITICS

The need for perpetuation of power politics is urged by Mr. E. H. Carr as a necessary piece of realism, in *The Twenty Years Crisis* :

"We can discard as purely Utopian and muddle-headed plans for a procedure of peaceful change dictated by a world legislature or a world court. We can describe as Utopian in the right sense (i.e. performing the proper function of a Utopia in proclaiming an ideal to be aimed at, though not wholly attainable) the desire to eliminate the element of power and to base the bargaining process of peaceful change on a common feeling of what is just and reasonable. But we shall keep also in mind the realist view of peaceful change as an adjustment to the changed relations of power ; and since the party which is able to bring most power to bear normally emerges successful from operations of peaceful change, we shall do our best to make ourselves as powerful as we can. In practice, we know that peaceful change can only be achieved through a compromise between the Utopian conception of a common feeling of right and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to a changed equilibrium of forces. That is why a successful foreign policy must oscillate between the apparently opposite poles of force and appeasement."¹

¹ Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, pp. 283-4.

"Power" in this quotation means in the last resort ability to make war, i.e. to commit mass-killing of combatants and non-combatants by high explosive, flame, famine and gas. "Peaceful change" in this quotation means such events as the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the Moroccan crisis of 1911, that is to say the direct precursors of the war of 1914-18. The certain result of each country seeking to make itself as "powerful" as possible, by acquiring the means of mass-killing, is not peaceful change, but mass-killing, precipitated by mutual fear. Realism, as interpreted by Mr. Carr, is a doctrine that the world is and must always be hell, because men cannot learn by experience. This is untrue. Men do learn by experience, and the experience of the past 50 years has probably convinced most ordinary men that allowing the relations of nations to be determined in any way by their national "power" to commit mass-murder, makes mass-murder certain: that for every nation, strong and weak alike, security from war is a good transcending all other goods. The reconciliation of morality and power lies not in oscillation between force and appeasement for national purposes, but in making force the instrument of a moral rather than an amoral purpose. "Peaceful change" means change to adjust legal rights to new circumstances, needs and views of justice, but *never* to a changed balance of power to kill.

REFUSAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The *Times* in an Editorial on 22nd May, 1944, contrasted the holding together of the British Commonwealth without bonds, "while the structure of constitutional commitments collapsed like a house of cards." It proceeded to a rhetorical question, to be answered in the negative. "Can it seriously be believed that either the United States or Soviet Russia or Great Britain or the members of the British Commonwealth are prepared to make formal surrender of their right of ultimate decision in unknown contingencies on the issue of war or peace?"

If this rhetorical question means that no one knows or should ever expect to know whether or not these nations will be prepared to supply force for international justice, it excludes the reign of law between nations. The only alternative is the rule of force. If this rhetorical question means that these nations claim the "right" to go to war according to their own unfettered discretion, it means that they reject the Kellogg Pact: it is a blank assertion of international anarchy. In the world of to-day, the question asked by the *Times* is unrealistic. No nation in the world can be safe by its own arms—the whole British Commonwealth cannot be safe by itself against possible coalitions. So long as war is possible, it must have allies and in making an alliance it sacrifices, if it is honourable, its free right of decision in future. For no country in the world is isolation a possible policy. Neutrality is dead. The practical alternatives are either membership of a world organisation for prevention of war or the alliance

system for making wars rarer, if possible, but certainly larger when they do break out.

In the earlier of the speeches collected in *Arms and the Covenant*, up to about March, 1934, Mr. Churchill expressed a nostalgia for the old independence. "We cannot afford to confide the safety of our country to the passions or to the panic of any foreign nation which may be facing some desperate crisis. We must be independent. We must be free. We must preserve our full latitude and discretion of choice. In the past we have always had this freedom and independence."¹ Mr. Churchill wanted Britain to be armed for her separate defence on sea and in the air, assuming that France and her allies would keep Germany in check on land. As the German menace grew, this hope of independence vanished; experience proved it to be chimerical and Mr. Churchill came to demand Britain's adhesion to the Covenant as well as to her own arms. Later still Britain involved herself in war, in hope of finding useful allies.

The "right of ultimate decision in unknown contingencies" for which the *Times* Editorial pines had gone from Britain for ever. The only choice is between joining an organisation of peace-loving powers committing each of them to go to war in support of international justice, and making selective alliances so as to be equal in power to any other prospective combination of enemies. The second of these alternatives represents the next false trail that calls for examination.

BALANCE OF POWER

In the twenty-five years which led up to the World War all nations in Europe, including Britain, came to realise the impossibility of standing alone. Step by step they became grouped in two great combinations—Germany and Austria facing Britain and France and Russia. This represented the culmination of the device of balance of power, which is rationalised by Mr. Harold Nicolson as follows: "Through centuries of conflict the Europeans had come to learn that war is in almost all cases contrived with the expectation of victory and that such an expectation is diminished under a system of balanced forces which renders victory difficult if not uncertain."² But experience has shown also that sooner or later this means only a bigger war. And it may bring the whole of each alliance into war on a quarrel with which most of them have no concern. That has been shown twice over. The choice is between world peace and world war. The emphatic condemnation of the alliance system by Mr. Cordell Hull and other leading Americans combined with their acceptance of the need of force to establish peace blazes the right trail, the only possible trail to safety.

¹ Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 116, March, 1934.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

³ See "Statement of United States Foreign Policy" printed in the Appendix, p. 94.

UNCHANGABLE FRONTIERS

The Report of the National Executive of the Labour Party on the International Post-war Settlement¹ contains the following: "The frontiers once drawn, should be regarded as settled, and all agitation for frontier revision should be discouraged. We should seek such international arrangements as will make frontiers less and less important as economic or cultural barriers, less barriers than bridges between nations. But 'national minorities' in Central Europe, left outside the boundaries of their own nation should be encouraged to rejoin it." This is applied particularly to Germans, because it is thought that Germans in many of those areas may have to face the choice between migration and massacre.

On this the comment must be made that it is not possible to settle frontiers for all time and least of all is it possible to settle them wisely when the settlement has to be made in the aftermath of a World War. The fifth of Mr. Harold Nicolson's twelve lessons from the breakdown of Versailles is that "no treaty can survive if it be regarded as unalterable." The second lesson is that "after a long war it is impossible to make a quick peace."² The evil that must be stopped is not change of frontiers or agitation for change, but change by violence or threats of violence. There must be some provision for peaceful change of boundaries—with the consent of the people transferred—and approved after investigation by an independent authority. It is true, of course, that it is desirable to reduce the differences between those who live on different sides of a frontier, but this depends entirely on the consent of the independent nations. It is better to have the frontiers adjustable by peaceful process in accord with the wish of the inhabitants than to interfere with the autonomy of the separate states in determining the conditions of those who live in them. As regards the reference to migration of Germans, the victors cannot tolerate massacre after war is over. If they disarm Germans they must protect them.

IMPOVERISHMENT OR DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

This topic can be introduced most conveniently by examining proposals which have emanated from organisations of different sections of political opinion—Conservative, Labour and Liberal.

A memorandum issued by a Post-War Policy Group of members of both Houses of Parliament in May, 1943, advocates "the control and where necessary, the closing down of Germany's war potential including the heavy and chemical industries to the extent to which they are the basis

¹ This Report was prepared for the Party Conference of 1944 which was postponed owing to war conditions.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. xiii and ix.

for the production of munitions." A later memorandum proposed that the mercantile marine and fishing fleets, and all fuel and power in Germany should be completely controlled by the Allied Nations and that all German patents and copyrights should be appropriated for the benefit of the United Nations: It deprecates money reparations mainly on the ground that "money payments . . . could only be furnished by a large restoration of German industry." The Group advocates also, the compulsory decentralisation of Germany into a number of autonomous states, including the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hesse, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Saxony and Baden. "Against a Prussia justly reduced to a population of some 13 millions instead of 39, the other states would have an opportunity of holding their own and acquiring the habit of self-government, which is indispensable to any real German reformation. No doubt Prussia will again attempt to dominate these adjoining states, but provided there is an adequate period of occupation by the Allies, there may be time for these areas to develop so strong a sense of local patriotism as would make them unwilling to come, once again, under the bellicose domination of Prussia." The members of this Post-War Policy Group are mainly, if not wholly, Conservative in politics, though they do not, of course, represent the Conservative Party.¹

The Report of the National Executive of the Labour Party contains the following: "Germany and Japan should be occupied for a considerable period after the war. . . . Some form of international control of the German and Japanese economic and financial system, including heavy industries, by the Governments of the United Nations, at least for a period of years must be worked out. The German war potential, that is to say German capacity to start another war, must be decisively reduced. Similarly with Japan." This Report says nothing about the dismemberment of Germany and apparently presumes that Germany will remain as a unit.

The Report of a Liberal Party Committee on *Germany After the War*,² lays down at the outset two principles; that Germany must not be allowed to establish such military force as will permit her to contemplate the possibility of successful aggression; and, that Germany must not be treated worse than other nations as regards economics, finance and welfare matters. It proposes a number of detailed arrangements to regulate the use and supply of key materials required for any possibility of rearmament for aggression on the part of Germany, while not harming in any essential particular, or indeed generally, her economic life. It deprecates attempts to control the German Budget; to deprive Germany of territories of which the inhabitants are overwhelmingly German: or to break up Germany by force. It stresses as the core of the problem the

¹ The Chairman of the Group is Sir John Wardlaw-Milne. The Group has issued two memoranda, in May, 1943, and August, 1944.

² The Chairman of the Committee was the Earl of Perth. The Report is dated May, 1944, and is trade distributed by Simpkin Marshall.

need for a change in the hearts and minds of the German people.

These various proposals raise the general question of the future of Germany, in regard to which, it is suggested, two fundamental propositions should be laid down.

Germany must be made impotent for war for all time, not only for a period of years.

2. The United Nations cannot undertake the government of Germany as a subject state.

The first of these propositions requires the permanent disarmament of Germany enforced by its effective inspection. "Permanent" means until the world organisation for preventing war is so firmly established that no arms are ever used for a national purpose. The second proposition requires that the United Nations should be able to find a responsible Government or Governments in Germany to co-operate with them. They will need this co-operation from the start, even during any period of occupation, and they must look for this co-operation among the best Germans, not among German counter-parts of Laval and Quisling. They can get such co-operation only by making a peace which leaves room for the restoration of German self-respect. This second proposition is the practical justification for giving to Germany a just peace rather than a vindictive peace, that is to say, for giving a peace, which in accord with the Atlantic Charter, will make it possible for all men in all lands, including Germany, to live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. The second proposition excludes, therefore, as practical measures proposals to interfere with the economic life of Germany more than is necessary to make re-armament impossible, as well as proposals for compulsory dismemberment of Germany.

The nature of the control and inspection required to make effective re-armament impossible at any time is a technical question. A Technical Committee should be asked to report the stage in the process of making armaments from their original raw material at which it is necessary to stop Germany, in order to make it certain that she cannot with any hope whatever of success at any time challenge the force available for World order. Since neither tanks nor aircraft can be made or tested in secret, it is reasonable to hope that this stage, beyond which Germany may not go in industry, can be a very late one, and, as is suggested in the Liberal Report, will not involve damage to the peaceful economic life of Germany.

As regards compulsory dismemberment, the hope expressed in the memorandum of the Post-War Policy Group that the various autonomous states of Germany will acquire a strong sense of local patriotism against Prussia while they are under occupation by Russians, British or Americans, can only be described as chimerical. Moreover, the suggestion that militarism is peculiarly Prussian rather than German is mistaken.

As Professor A. Wolf says in his account of *Higher Education in Nazi Germany*,¹ "Pagan Prussia is bad enough, but Catholic Bavaria is even worse, and was the storm centre during all the turbulent years of preparation for the second World War."

The need for a change of German mentality from that which supported the barbaric Nazi ambition is plain, and the monstrous character of the Nazi educational machine which contributed to this mentality between the wars, has been shown above. But those who talk of re-educating Germans sometimes forget two things: that experience is a greater educator than books, and that education requires the co-operation of the pupil.

As regards experience, nothing that the United Nations can possibly give in the way of education after the War will compare in effectiveness with the lesson which they have given in war. One of the most important passages in *Mein Kampf* is the "political testament" which Hitler ordered to be printed in large type:

"Never tolerate the coming into existence of two continental powers in Europe. See an attack on Germany in every attempt to organise on the frontiers of Germany a second military power, be it only in the form of the creation of a state with the potentialities of military power and see in any such attempt not only the right but the duty to prevent by all means, including the use of arms, the coming into existence of such a state, or if such a state has already come into existence, to demolish it."

This passage explains the attack on Soviet Russia in 1941, the one best chance of giving effect to the political testament. The effect of that attack is that an equal or greater continental power is established for all time. Germany can never hope again to dominate Europe by arms, and therefore, she cannot hope to dominate the world. She may be found very soon on the side of the angels and of the pacific settlement of disputes. The emergence of Russia is a portent which has changed the world. It may make the problem of universal lasting peace far easier than it used to seem; at least it may remove one of the major difficulties of the past.

As regards dependence of education on the co-operation of the pupil, the opportunity given by the war of changing the mentality of the German people will be thrown away if we continue to suppress them. The irreconcilable Nazis will try to keep alive an underground movement of revolt and revenge. So far as they can, they will continue to train youth to be mad dogs. "Unless we can discover some way in which after elimination of the Nazis, Germany's self-respect can be restored—German youth left in a vacuum and hated by all their neighbours will relapse into the mad dog mood."²

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

² Dr. Gilbert Murray in the *Spectator*, 8th September, 1944 (p. 214).

We cannot counter this move by suppression ; the failure of the German domination of Europe in four years of war to suppress the underground movements has a moral for us in future. We can kill the spirit of revolt and revenge only by making room for a different spirit to grow in its place, and by encouraging that growth. We must make it clear to all Germans that the door to domination of other peoples by force is closed to them forever, but that every other door to civilised equality with other nations will be open to them. In the brilliant phrase of Mr. Walter Lippmann we must find a way to make "the defeat irrevocable and the peace acceptable." ¹

The proposition that, since we cannot govern Germany indefinitely by force, we should make a peace which neither impoverishes her needlessly nor dismembers her, nor deprives her of all hope and way of return to self-respect, does not mean that there should be no reparation of war damage and no punishment of criminals. But there will probably be general agreement with the line taken both in the Labour and the Liberal Reports cited above, that both reparations and punishment of war criminals should be got over and out of the way as rapidly as possible, and that reparation should be in kind by those who want it rather than in money. And the crime for which Nazi leaders should be punished is not the making of war against the strong—against Soviet Russia or the United States or the British Commonwealth. The crimes which have made them abominable for all time are the persecution of the weak and the corruption of youth.

PERMANENT DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN NATIONS

This false trail is typified by passages in the Prime Minister's speech of 24th May, 1944 on Foreign Policy, as to the form of Government and as to the inapplicability of the Atlantic Charter to Germany. Germany, Italy and Japan are not to be allowed to have fascist governments, but "internal political problems in Spain are a matter for the Spaniards themselves." "A very clear line of distinction can be drawn between nations we go to war with and nations who leave you alone." "The Atlantic Charter in no way binds us about the future of Germany—nor is it a bargain or contract with our enemies." There is to be no loophole for a claim by the Germans in respect of the Atlantic Charter, similar to that made by them in respect of Wilson's Fourteen Points.²

The criticism to be made on this is that permanent discrimination in the treatment of nations, according as they have fought wholly against us, partly against us, or partly or wholly with us, amounts to making war perpetual. It excludes the "family of nations." Any "Charter of Human Rights" must apply to all nations. We cannot allow Spaniards

¹ *U.S. War Aims*, p. 59 (Hamish Hamilton, 1944).

² The Atlantic Charter is printed in the Appendix, p. 91.

or Poles to persecute Jews or Liberals while forbidding Germans to do so. As regards the Atlantic Charter, while it is right to exclude any previous bargain with the enemy as to the terms on which he ceases fighting, we must express and execute our determination that ultimately *all* men in *all* lands shall be able to live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. The opening words of the Charter declare that its signatories seek no aggrandizement territorial or other. The next words declare that the signatories desire to see no territorial changes which do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. The signatories of the Charter are now all the United Nations. If the declarations just cited mean only that the United Nations seek no aggrandizement except at the expense of Germany, Japan or Italy, and that they desire no transfers of territory from other powers, except with the desire of the inhabitants, the declarations hardly seem to have been worth making. No one supposed that the United Nations planned to aggrandize themselves at the expense of one another or of the neutrals.

NOTE ON CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The subjects of the last two sections are dealt with in a speech which I made on 27th February in the House of Commons Debate on the Crimea Conference, and which is being reprinted with other speeches in a volume to be published shortly on *Why I am a Liberal*. The bearing of the Charter on the decisions of that Conference affords inexhaustible scope for argument. The practical conclusions which I suggest are as follows :—

(i) The Atlantic Charter should not be held to bar territorial re-arrangements accompanied by transfers of population which can be shown to be necessary either for the purpose of making Germany impotent for war or of removing causes of international friction. On this latter ground, in the Debate I supported both the choice of the Curzon line as basis for the eastern boundary of Poland and the transfer to Poland of Danzig and East Prussia, with removal of the German inhabitants.

(ii) Forcible partition of Germany is a futile and unnecessary procedure. I hold to this, in spite of the support given to partition by Mr. Sumner Welles in his interesting and important book *The Time for Decision* (published here by Hamish Hamilton) which I had not read till after this volume was written. If the three or more States into which Germany is divided are ever allowed to have arms, they will unite those arms at once in war. If, as I propose, they are never allowed to have arms while national war remains possible, there is no sense in compelling them to have separate railway systems, or post offices, or schools.

(iii) Transfer to other powers of territories whether on the east or on the west which continue to be inhabited by Germans, is a departure both from the Atlantic Charter which, though not a bargain with Germany, must (as is argued above), be held to have been made with reference to Germany, and from the conditions of lasting peace.

CONDITIONS AND METHODS OF LASTING PEACE

THE WORLD-WIDE RULE OF LAW

To ensure peace it is not sufficient to be peace-loving, because, as Mr. Churchill once said, "every Power is peace-loving always."¹ No nation and, with a few lunatic exceptions, no individual desires war, just as no man desires venereal disease. But, in order to avoid venereal disease, it is necessary to avoid desiring things which involve risk of disease and acting in such a way as to make the disease likely. War is the penalty for the way in which nations have mis-managed their relations in the past. So long as each nation insists on being judge in its own cause and enforcing its judgments by its own armed strength, there is risk of war. So long as any large nation feels justified in using its strength for its own advantage, there is likelihood of war. So long as each nation is allowed to prepare for war by piling up armaments in its own discretion, there is practical certainty of war, through mutual fear. To ensure peace it is not sufficient that all nations should prefer peace to war, however sincerely. It is necessary also that they should give up aims which can be satisfied only at the cost of war or by threat of war and should give up practices which make war inevitable. It is necessary not only that they should give up wrong aims but that they should establish force for international order. To ensure peace it is necessary to will the means as well as the end.

With the experience of nearly ten years of general war in the last thirty years and of the other twenty years being occupied largely in preparation for war and in minor wars, the nations of the world should ask themselves whether there is not something fundamentally wrong in the political structure of the world. The answer is simple. There is something fundamentally wrong and its name is international anarchy. What makes war possible is the fact that the relations of nations to one another are governed not by law binding on all, but by the self-interest and the force of each nation. International law is not law in the sense in which national law governing the relations of individuals within each state is law, with courts to declare it, with police to enforce it, with legislatures to revise it.

International anarchy is the condition which makes war possible. It has always been that. The new lessons that the world should draw from the experience of the past fifty years are, first, that international anarchy makes war not merely possible, but certain, and, second, that any war,

¹ Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 149.

today, in contrast to earlier wars, is certain to be total and nearly certain to become general. International anarchy is the soil of war. It is the prepared ground from which, sooner or later, war will arise as a poisonous growth stifling the happiness of mankind. If international anarchy is the soil of war, what are its seeds? The answer given here is that they are not now the natural pugnacity of mankind, the economic system or conditions, or the special wickedness of Germans. The seeds of modern war are ambition of rulers, revenge and fear. To prevent war it is desirable to prevent any of these seeds from finding lodgment in the world. But that is only secondary. The essential step is to abolish the international anarchy which alone gives these seeds of war the chance to develop; the principal seed of war—fear—is itself largely a product of international anarchy.

Abolition of international anarchy means establishing the rule of law between nations, as in an ordered community there is the rule of law between citizens. The rule of law requires three things: an organ to declare and interpret the law, that is, to say what are the rights and duties of those subject to law; an organ to revise the law in accord with changing needs, circumstances and views of justice; an organ to enforce the law, promptly and universally. These three things represent the judicial, the legislative and the executive function; each of them is equally necessary. It is not sufficient merely to have organs for declaring the law and enforcing it as it stands. That is a perpetuation of the *status quo* and of privilege between nations as between individuals. It is not sufficient to set up arbitration tribunals to which disputants may have recourse if they agree to do so, but which they are free to disregard. It is not sufficient to have tribunals for all cases, unless it is certain that the decisions of the tribunals will be enforced, by force if necessary.

Abolition of international anarchy means setting up a super-national authority to decide by justice issues between nations which are now decided by force, open or concealed. Before considering the nature and scope of this super-national authority, it is necessary to consider how its existence will affect the position of separate nations and the rights which they claim or enjoy. How will establishment of the rule of law between nations affect sovereignty? How will it affect armaments? How will it affect the possibility of change of the *status quo*?

SOVEREIGNTY UNDER LAW

Does establishing the rule of law between nations involve any surrender of national sovereignty? That depends on the meaning given to the term sovereignty. If sovereignty means that a nation is not

only absolutely self-governing in its own affairs but is entitled to be a law to itself in dealing with other nations, judging of its own cause and enforcing its judgments by its own force and that of its allies, then sovereignty means anarchy, then sovereignty is inconsistent with the rule of law and while it continues makes war inevitable. If, on the other hand, the sovereignty of a nation means autonomy in all domestic and economic affairs, combined with acceptance of impartial justice in its relations to other nations, then to establish the rule of law involves no surrender of sovereignty, then the rule of law increases national independence, for it makes it no longer necessary for any nation to become dependent on another nation, as protector or ally.

In his Burge Memorial Lecture in 1935, Lord Lothian interpreted sovereignty in the first sense, as meaning that every sovereign state was a law to itself at home and abroad. On this interpretation he concluded that: "The sovereignty of the national state has been the main cause of the failure of the League and the post-war peace movement, as it was the ultimate cause of the World War and will be the dynamic cause of the next war, unless we can mitigate it in time."¹ "If we are to have an enduring peace, we cannot allow every state, or any state, to act as though it were independent and absolute in determining its relation to other states."² But it is not necessary to interpret sovereignty in this extreme sense, and it is impossible to believe that the leaders of the United Nations in 1943 interpreted it so in the Moscow declaration, in basing the organisation of peace on the "sovereign equality" of all peace loving nations.³ For sovereignty in this extreme sense is inconsistent with equality; it leaves small or weak nations without any rights, able to live only by favour of or in dependence on stronger neighbours. On this interpretation of sovereignty, "sovereign equality" would be a contradiction in terms. It is only "in law and under law," to use the words of the United States Statement of 21st March, 1944, on Foreign Policy,⁴ that each sovereign nation, large or small, can be the equal of every other nation. Sovereignty in any practical sense must not mean license to behave at all time exactly as one pleases but the right to manage one's own affairs "in such a way as not to menace the peace and security of other nations."

If sovereignty means the right of every one of seventy or more national states of the world to go to war whenever it pleases, then obviously we must either give up sovereignty or give up the hope of lasting peace. But that is an unnecessary meaning for sovereignty. Most ordinary citizens today would agree with the saying of Mr. Justice Parker that

¹ Lothian, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

² R. M. MacIver, *Towards an Abiding Peace*, p. 21 (Macmillan and Co., New York, 1943).

³ The Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, is printed in the Appendix, p. 92.

⁴ Printed in Appendix, p. 94.

"there has been much nonsense talked about sovereignty."¹ They would reject that nonsense and hold that, in future, sovereignty for the nation, like freedom for the citizen, must be interpreted as freedom to live under a rule of law which is the same for all. Just as the freedom of citizens is made greater and not less by the rule of law, so is the independence of nations. Freed from the fear of war, from the endlessly growing burden of armaments, from the pressure of entangling alliances, every nation under the rule of law will have greater secure independence than any could achieve in the international anarchy of the past.

ARMS UNDER LAW

The place of armed force in a world subject to law should be governed by three general principals.

(i) Armed force may never be used for a national purpose. This is the principle laid down in 1928 by the Pact of Paris, known unofficially as the Kellogg Pact. "The high contracting Parties solemnly declare that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy." It has been re-stated in the eighth point of the Atlantic Charter: "all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force." The Pact of Paris in 1928 was signed by practically all the Governments of the world, including those of Germany, Italy and Japan, who set out to break it almost as soon as they had signed. The Atlantic Charter has been adopted not only by the two original signatories, but by all the United Nations,² that is to say by all those who, when fighting ends this time, will be in charge of the world. It will rest with them to make certain, by example and by precept, that this principle becomes the universal practice. For without it there can be no rule of law. The citizen in an ordered community may not take the law into his own hands. In an ordered world no nation must feel free to take the law into its own hands.

(ii) The rights of each nation must not depend on whether it is

¹ *World Organization* by Hon. John J. Parker, Senior Judge of the United States Circuit. This article appearing originally in the *American Bar Association Journal* of November, 1943 is re-printed by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace in International Conciliation No. 397 of February 1944. The sentence quoted is at p. 158 and the author after citing a legal dictum "Sovereignty is the right to govern" proceeds: "This right is not arbitrary, but arises out of the nature of the relationship to which it applies. . . . If a matter concerns me and nobody else, I am the one to decide about it. If it concerns the people of North Carolina and nobody else, the people of North Carolina should decide. If it concerns the people of the United States and nobody else, they should decide. If, however, it concerns the international society of the world, that society, properly organised, should make the decision.

² By a Joint Declaration made at Washington on 1st January, 1942.

armed or on the scale of its armaments. Within each state the rule of law means making life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness secure for the unarmed citizen. In the international sphere the rule of law means making the world safe for small nations and unarmed nations, and so for all nations. This is the sixth point of the Atlantic Charter, the establishing of "a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all the lands, may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

(iii) There must be sufficient arms in the world to enforce the rule of law and keep wrong-doers in order. Even the most law-abiding community cannot dispense with police. In the international sphere public opinion without force is even less sufficient as a means of deterring wrong-doers than it is in the national sphere, for nations do not live together as closely as do the citizens of the same State; they are less not more, amenable to public opinion. Peace at need must be enforced.

These are the three principles in respect of armed force which must be put into practice, if the rule of law and peace are to be established between nations. They leave open the question as to how the force needed to maintain order should be supplied, and how it should be organised and controlled. It is clear that in any case the bulk of the armed force in the world will originate in the near future in three great confederations: the United States, the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union. Men coming from these confederations will have to undertake the prime responsibility for policing the world, whatever is done by other nations. Whether and to what extent they should do so as a single force permanently united under joint control, or, in the alternative, should do so as allied though separate forces, is an issue on which judgment must be reserved until the nature of the supernational authority for peace is known. Mr. Winston Churchill in his broadcast of 21st March, 1943, spoke of "armed forces, national or international or both," held ready to enforce the decisions of a high court of justice and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars. The Soviet Union are said to have suggested an international air force with separate national armies and navies.

But though the three principles leave open the question—partly technical and partly political—as to how the armed force required to maintain the rule of law should be organised and controlled, they do not leave open the question of how armed force should be used and how it should be regarded. Those who wield it must regard themselves as trustees for international order, not as agents of any particular nation. This is the first of the three principles and the most important. If it is carried to its logical conclusion, the second principle follows almost automatically; if force can never be used by national decision for a national purpose, then the rights of each particular nation will not depend upon its

strength and the motive to competitive building up of armaments will disappear. This in turn will make easier the acceptance of the third principle, and the policing of the world with a minimum of arms and of expenditure upon them. In a completely ordered community like Britain, where ordinary citizens do not carry guns, the police can be armed with nothing more than truncheons. But whether large or small absolutely, the force assigned to police the world must be overwhelming in relation to any force that may challenge it. From this follow two practical conclusions.

First, there must be bases appropriately distributed throughout the world at the disposal of those who, as an international force or combination of national forces, undertake the policing of the world. These "international police stations," whose importance lies in their strategic position will be excluded from the general principle of self-determination governing territorial boundaries. They cannot be allowed to fall into weak or careless hands.

Second, no nation should be free to build up armaments at its own discretion. The third of the Fourteen Points of 1918 proposed "adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Reduction of armaments of all nations was thus made an essential part of the peace settlement. The practical application of this principle was not happy. The peace-loving victorious nations devoted much energy at Disarmament Conferences to disarming one another, while at the same time they failed completely to stop re-armament by the war-loving defeated nations. This error, or anything like it, must never be repeated. There must be sufficient force in the world to maintain peace and that force must be in the hands of those who can be trusted to use it for peace rather than aggression. Nevertheless, as is recognised in the Atlantic Charter, regulation of arms of all nations is vital to enduring peace. From two World Wars, two lessons must be drawn: one that, "domestic safety" cannot be achieved by national arms; the other, that any attempt to achieve safety by national arms is self-defeating and leads to war. The building up of national armaments, by the fear they breed, is the way to renewal of war, nor can any valid distinction be drawn between offensive and defensive weapons. The thorny problem of national armaments must be faced and solved if we desire lasting peace.

This problem is dealt with sanely and practically by an anonymous author in *A Liberal Plan for Peace*,¹ on the basis of two principles. "The first is that of publicity, which should be given the greatest prominence in all problems of international relations. The United Nations should be called upon to declare to the International Executive [which the plan contemplates as an authority for policing the World] what establishments

¹ Published by Victor Gollancz in 1944 with an introduction by Lord Crewe.

they propose to maintain. The second principle may cause more heart-burning, yet it seems necessary. It will be the duty of the International Executive to have sufficient force in readiness to oppose any act of violence with an overwhelming superiority. It cannot discharge this duty unless it knows what forces it may have to oppose. It seems to follow that it should have the right of inspection."¹ The Plan recognizes further that it may be necessary to make a differentiation in this matter between the defeated enemy powers, the small peace-loving powers, and the Great Powers, upon whom the main responsibility for world order must rest. The enemy powers will be inspected permanently and completely as part of the terms of peace. The small peace-loving powers will be required to submit to regulation and inspection as a condition of the guarantee of their borders and their independence. The Great Powers must agree to inspection voluntarily, since it cannot well be enforced against any one of them that refuses. On this it is suggested that the British Commonwealth should give a lead by expressing "unreserved willingness to lay all her establishments open to inspection, subject to the other great powers doing the same."

Whatever the form and method adopted, the main principle is clear—armaments at one's own discretion must be regarded as no longer an appanage of nationhood. Armaments may be denied indefinitely to particular nations and this denial must be enforced by effective inspection. Armaments should be regulated in the case of all other nations. For armaments make fear and fear makes war.

CHANGE UNDER LAW

The rule of law does not mean the rule of privilege and the perpetuation by force of the *status quo*. Within each state there must be provision, not merely for interpreting and enforcing the law as it stands at any moment, but also for revising the law in accord with changing circumstances and views of social policy; changing the law means changing the rights of individual citizens. As between states there must also be provision for peaceful change of rights, authorised and enforced by impartial authority, "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its own conservation." This famous remark of Burke's applies as fully to the community of nations as to the citizens of a single state. A new world order which consisted simply of the eternal preservation of the legal *status quo*, would inevitably become unjust as circumstances changed and sooner or later, losing moral authority, would break down.

Change is inevitable. Change of rights between nations in the past has hitherto been brought about by war or the threat of war; if the

¹*Op. cit.*, 23-4.

nations could not agree, that has been the only way of change.¹ If now we want to stop war it is imperative to substitute some method of peaceful change. That was recognised in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which by Article 19 contemplated a revision of treaties and rights between nations. It was not recognised in the General Treaty of 1928 for Renunciation of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) which prohibited war as an instrument either of enforcing law or changing it, but put nothing in its place. Article 19 remained a dead letter because it required unanimous consent. The General Treaty of 1928 was a logical absurdity; it was broken at once by Japan, Germany and Italy, the self-styled "unsatisfied powers."

The problem of peaceful change between nations, though brought into special prominence by the Versailles Treaty is both older and more general. The new world order must include machinery for ordered change, in order to exclude change by force whether open or concealed, as the organisation of each state includes, in the form of a legislature, machinery for changing the rights of citizens. It does not follow that anything like a legislature is required or would be suitable in the international sphere. The lives of citizens in a modern state touch one another continuously at innumerable points. The points of contact between nations are few and specialised. The nature of the machinery required for change of rights between nations depends on the issues that are likely to arise and threaten dispute. These issues are considered in the next section under the four heads of Boundaries, Colonies, Economic Relations, and Minorities.

THE ISSUES BETWEEN NATIONS

Boundaries. The first of these is the most important; the problems both of Colonies and of Minorities are in a sense only special forms of the problem of Boundaries. On the assumption that there is overwhelming force at the disposal of an international authority for prevention of war, one of the factors which have caused nations to seek to extend their territories—namely the desire to be stronger in war or to have a strategic frontier—will disappear. But other grounds for territorial revision will remain. This revision must not, as under Article 19 of the Covenant, require the consent of the parties affected, nor must it be made by a

¹The problem of peaceful change is examined historically by C.R.M.F. Cruttwell in a volume published in 1937 by the Oxford University Press: *A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World*. Its various aspects—political, economic, legal—form the subject of a series of lectures by various authorities given at the London School of Economics and Political Science in the same year and published by Macmillan, under the title *Peaceful Change: An International Problem*, edited by C. A. W. Manning.

majority vote of all the nations of the world, for this leads only to "log-rolling." It is a matter for a Boundaries Tribunal applying the principle of self-determination, that is to say paying regard first and foremost to the wishes of the inhabitants of the area in dispute, ascertained by an impartially conducted plebiscite.¹ Self-determination will not apply either to particular spots in the world whose importance is essentially strategic, or to backward regions, that is to say those in which, through lack of education, the inhabitants are not yet capable of self-determination. The first will be excluded, as "international police stations." The second will be "Colonies." Everywhere else the principle embodied in the Soviet Constitution, giving to every state of the Soviet Union the right of secession at any time, should apply. This is the practice of the British Commonwealth. It is laid down as the second proposition of the Atlantic Charter that there should be "no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." From the necessity of providing for peaceful change, in place of blindly defending the *status quo*, it follows that, if the people concerned do freely express a wish for change, that wish, subject only to the reservation for police bases, should receive effect.

Colonies. It is clear, however, that not all peoples are yet qualified—by education and the practice of democracy—for self-determination. This is the justification—in the last resort it is the only justification—for continuance of colonial administration, that is to say for the government of of certain parts of the earth not as sovereign states from within, but to some extent from without. The whole problem of Colonies cannot be examined here. It is the subject of another Target for Tomorrow written by Dr. Julian Huxley and Phyllis Deane and published already. In the concluding section of the Target, on the assumption that a World Organisation for peace is established, operating largely through Regional Authorities, the general aims in relation to Colonies are summarised as follows :—

(i) The colonial problem must be regarded as part of the general international problem. Once a world organisation exists capable of guaranteeing peace and promoting general economic welfare, the development of colonial peoples towards self-government and eventual equality with other nations in social, educational and economic standards, can best be promoted within the framework of that organisation.

(ii) Existing colonial powers should continue to exercise adminis-

¹ The working of plebiscites is described by C. R. M. F. Cruttwell in Chapter V. of the book just cited. Of the inter-war plebiscites it is there stated as "both undeniable and surprising that, taken as a whole, the conduct of these votes was fair and their result beneficial in allaying animosities and sowing seeds of permanence." These inter-war plebiscites were marked by the high proportion of voting, the decisive character of the results, and the disagreement of the results in some cases with linguistic and cultural statistics (p. 173).

trative responsibility, but subject to advice, review and inspection from the relevant Regional Authorities of the World Organisation. They should appoint a proportion of the nationals of other countries to their colonial services.

(iii) Each Regional Authority should be provided with permanent secretariat and inspectorate, experts and research staff, together with funds to aid development.

(iv) The Regional Authorities should contain representatives of the independent nations and of the colonial powers within the area, of the colonial peoples themselves, of nations especially interested in the strategic or economic aspects of the region, and of some nations without special interests in the region.

(v) If other nations in the international organisation are willing to accept their share of responsibility for military security and economic prosperity, the Regional Authority should have wide rights: e.g. inspection, the investigation of grievances on the spot, the publication of reports with its own comments, advice and the suggestion of policy aimed at securing self-government and high standards of welfare for the native inhabitants, etc.

(vi) Strategic bases in the colonies should be transferred as soon as possible to the World Organisation. If an International Police Force comes into being, such bases should be garrisoned by it.

(vii) A Colonial Charter should be proclaimed as soon as possible, based on the principle of equality of opportunity for all peoples, on the doctrine of trusteeship, and on the association of the peoples of the Colonies with those of the advanced nations in a progressive partnership.

(viii) In the Charter, Colonial Powers should renounce the right to transfer territories to other powers, to alienate further land or mineral rights, to encourage further white or foreign settlement, and to employ forced labour or other measures discriminating against the local inhabitants.

(ix) The progressive raising of standards of welfare is best achieved through a series of International Colonial Conventions established through the I.L.O.

The suggested provisions of the Colonial Charter include the following :—

(a) Colonial territories are held in trust, and their peoples are associated in partnership with those of the signatories to the Charter, and in particular with those of the particular colonial power responsible for administration in each case.

(b) The primary aim of the trusteeship is to enable the colonial peoples to reach self-government as rapidly as possible.

(c) Its second major aim is to develop colonial territories, primarily for the benefit of their own inhabitants, and to improve the health, welfare and education of their peoples.

(d) Trusteeship is exercised jointly by all the signatories, but its

administrative and legislative responsibilities are delegated to the existing colonial powers.

(e) There exists no inherent or permanent inequality in principle between races or peoples. The goal is equality of status, opportunity, and welfare for all, to be realised as quickly as possible.

(f) All signatory nations shall have equality of economic and other opportunity in the colonies, subject only to the primacy of the interests of the local inhabitants and to need for efficient administration.

(g) In accordance with the foregoing principles, the following are expressly forbidden : the transfer of colonial territory to the charge of another power, except at the express wish of the local population ; the further alienation of land or mineral rights ; the further encouragement of white or other foreign settlement ; all discriminatory treatments of local population, such as forced labour or the pass system.

These proposals embody assertion in respect of all colonies of the principle of trusteeship, that is to say, that the state administering the colony should do so not for its own benefit, but first for the benefit of the resident population and second for the equal common advantage of all nations in good order and trade. This points to treating all colonies as mandates, subject to effective inspection and report by an international Colonial Commission. Administering for the benefit of the resident population means preparing that population by raising the standard of living and education, and by continuous development of local self-government, for full self-determination. It does not mean throwing all colonies open to impartial exploitation by private traders.

Economic Relations : On the view taken here, the economic relations of sovereign states can be based on contract, that is to say, on treaties freely negotiated, and should not be determined by a super-national authority. All that any super-national authority for peace need do is to provide a court of arbitration, for the interpretation of economic treaties, if that is not included as part of the treaty itself. The treaties themselves may be of different kinds : some general—setting up a Clearing Union, or an International Investment Board ; some special—adjusting tariffs or trading relations between pairs or groups of particular countries. Most of them will contain their own appropriate provision for settlement of disputes, their own sanctions for breach of the agreement, and their provision for the right of any party by due notice to terminate the arrangement. Once the motive of increasing one's national war potential is removed, economic relations will be entered into only for the common purpose of increasing wealth by exchange. This does not mean that one nation may not harm another by economic measures, such as violent changes of tariffs or dumping whether subsidised or not, or maintenance of a permanent export surplus unbalanced by long term lending¹.

¹ In Part VI of my Report on Full Employment in a Free Society, it is argued that any plan for multilateral trading between any group of countries can be

But the prohibition or limitation of such practices should be included in the commercial treaties freely entered into by each country ; the sanction against such practices should be not war, but withdrawal from the arrangement.

Nor does the view that economic relations between sovereign states should be based on contract mean that there is no value in continuous organised consultation between States, through agencies of the type of the International Labour Office and the Economic Division of the League of Nations. There is great and growing room for such agencies. But they should be consultative, depending upon the free assent of the separate States, and making therefore no inroad on sovereignty.

Minorities : However boundaries are drawn there will remain in many states groups of people of a different race, language or culture from that of the majority, but so situated geographically that they cannot be transferred with their territory to some other state. Is their treatment to be in any way a concern of anyone outside their state ? It should not, on the grounds of nationality, be the concern of any other individual state. Should it—on grounds of human rights—be the concern of an international authority ? Whatever answer is given to this question, formidable difficulties arise. To answer it in the negative and say that it is no concern of the rest of the world how Turks treat Armenians, how Germans, Poles and others treat Jews, or how the different racial and religious communities in India treat one another, is repellent to the conscience of humanity. To answer it positively might be held to raise the question of the treatment of coloured people in the United States, or South Africa ; and would involve an inroad on internal sovereignty which can hardly be justified as essential for the prevention of war.

This thorny question allows probably of no simple or uniform solution. Acceptance by a nation of a code of human rights should probably be regarded as a condition of its membership of any international organisation for peace, with the guarantees that this will provide against external attack. But the rights forming the subject of the code should be passive rights, concerned with security against oppression and such matters as freedom of worship, speech, writing, language and association rather than the active political rights concerned with the form of government. Democracy on the British or American model, while it is the best guarantee both for the essential human liberties and for peaceful tendency in international affairs, cannot well be made a condition of

permanent and work smoothly only if each of the countries accepts three conditions: first, of pursuing at home a policy of full employment and avoiding severe fluctuations of employment ; second, of taking or assenting to all the measures necessary to balance its accounts with the rest of the world, and avoiding want of balance whether by way of excess or deficiency ; third, of displaying reasonable continuity and stability in commercial policy, that is, in regard to tariffs and other methods of regulating foreign trade.

admission to international security. It may be hoped that in an ordered world, with fear and hope of war for national purposes removed and with the possibility of peaceful change, the problem of Minorities will be far less acute than in the past. No nation-state will have the same motive as in the past to support or foster discontent in a racial minority of a neighbouring state with a view to increasing its power for war relatively to that of the neighbouring state.

SUPER-NATIONAL AUTHORITY NOT A WORLD STATE

The issues that may be expected to arise in practice between nations and on which under the rule of law they must accept decisions from a super-national authority, in place of taking the law into their own hands, have now been reviewed. The review suggests that to describe the setting up of such a super-national authority as the constitution of a World-State is a perverse and unreasonable use of language for purposes of prejudice. The State today is an all pervasive organisation which touches the life of the citizen continually at many points. A super-national authority for preventing disputes as to boundaries, colonies, minorities or the interpretation of economic agreements from leading to war would have no similar activity and need have no similar constitution. It would be active in regard to any particular state not continually, but only from time to time. It would be not a World-State but a system of compulsory arbitration excluding recourse to national arms. It remains to consider the nature of such a super-national authority for arbitration, its geographical scope and its terms of reference.

THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF A SUPER-NATIONAL AUTHORITY

THE FEDERALIST ARGUMENT.

Appreciation of the failure of the League of Nations leads many people to argue that it is impossible to build up a super-national authority on the basis of separate national states. If the men who form the authority are persons nominated by national governments, they will never be anything but delegates of those governments; they will always be bound to put first the particular interest of their national state and not the general interest of world order. That this is in fact how the League of Nations in general operated is clear: "We are faced at Geneva with the following reality: that the Powers—large and small—carry their difficulties and their conflicts of interest to the League of Nations. These conflicts do not shrink at Geneva; they expand. The Great Powers in conflict with one another seek for allies among the lesser Powers and form hostile groups which complicate and aggravate the situation; the small states court the support of the Great Powers, who, in order to maintain their diplomatic combinations, at once take sides. . . . During my stay at Geneva, I never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by an agreement between the Great Powers. . . . A few states that remain outside of fixed diplomatic combinations, and are therefore able to maintain an independent attitude, have from time to time exercised a conciliatory influence at Geneva, but this only happens in the case of secondary disputes, and, moreover, these lesser Powers not having at their disposal the forces that might become necessary to back their action, are themselves compelled to have recourse to the Great Powers."¹ Each representative in the Council or Assembly of a League of Nations based on the contractual co-operation of sovereign states, "is in the last resort, the delegate of his own state, controlled by it and responsible to it. Every important problem tends therefore to be considered as a conflict of national points of view. The Council and the Assembly are in essence diplomatic conferences."²

On this view, the failure of the League of Nations was not due to any detail—such as the need for unanimity or the procedure for settling disputes or enforcing decisions—but to its character as a League of separate national states. On this view, the only super-national authority that can be

¹ Signor Grandi in the *Foreign Policy of the Powers* (New York, 1935) pp. 86–87 cited at p. 418 of *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* by Professor A. E. Zimmern (Macmillan, 1939).

² Lord Lothian in *Pacifism is Not Enough (nor Patriotism Either)* pp. 27–28, Burge Memorial Lecture, 1935, reprinted by Oxford University Press, 1941).

trusted to act internationally is one consisting of men who are directly responsible, not to the governments of particular states, but to the individual citizens. This is the fundamental argument of those who say that the establishment of world order requires, not a League or Confederation of national states, but a Federal Union of Peoples. There must for every citizen be two governments elected by and responsible to the citizens: a national government for national affairs and an international government for international affairs. That is the meaning of federation: two governments at least for every citizen, on the ground that one government will not serve all his different needs.

The leading, though not of course the only or the oldest example of federal government in the world is the United States of America.¹ After independence from Britain had been declared in 1776, the thirteen original colonies formed in 1781 a Confederation in which each of them retained its independence in all matters, so that co-operation depended on agreement between their separate governments. "No true national executive existed. No national system of courts had been set up. The Continental Congress, which consisted of one house in which each State had a single vote, was too weak to be effective. It could not levy taxes, enlist troops, punish men who broke the laws it passed, or compel the States to observe the treaties it made with other countries."² The Confederation was a League of States. Almost at once this was found to be unsatisfactory. In 1787, confederation was replaced by federation, in which certain powers were transferred from the separate States to a Federal Government, with a legislature (Congress) elected by and responsible to the individual voters, with a Federal Judiciary and a Federal Executive, in the shape of the President, equally elected by and responsible to the voters. The powers so transferred were defined in a written Constitution; everything not transferred remained with the separate states. The interpretation of the constitution in respect of this as of other matters was placed in the hands of a Supreme Court, independent both of President and of Congress. Thus every citizen of the United States has two governments—State and Federal—each with full powers within its own sphere.

Description of federation as meaning at least two governments for every citizen does not, at first blush, make federation seem attractive; most British citizens are apt to think that one government is plenty or more than plenty: why must we have two? The answer of the federalist is that two governments are necessary, because there are two distinct jobs to be

¹ Switzerland, Canada, South Africa, Australia, are other instances of federal government.

² *America: The Story of a Free People* by Allan Nevins and Henry Steele Commager, p. 97 (Oxford University Press, 1942). This short authoritative history of the American people from the first settlements in 1607 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in 1942, is an invaluable contribution to the mutual understanding of the British and American democracies.

done. The citizens of each nation want their own way of life ; that they can get only from a national government. They want also security from war ; that they cannot get from any national government, because no nation can be safe by its own arms ; they can get that only from an international government. Two governments are needed because there are two jobs to be done and the same tool will not serve for both jobs. One needs two governments at least, as one needs two tools at least for digging hard ground : a fork to break up the earth and a spade to shift it.

Today, accordingly, many people argue that the time has come to extend the principle of federation across national boundaries, that only in this way—by establishing an international government directly responsible to the citizens and with powers in its prescribed sphere independent of the separate national governments—can peace be made secure. The most distinguished, the most experienced and the most eloquent upholder of this view is the late Lord Lothian. His argument is set out in the Burge Memorial Lecture given by him in 1935 under the title "Pacifism is Not Enough, Nor Patriotism Either" reprinted in 1941 after his death, by the Oxford University Press. In the Preface, which I wrote for this reprint, I summarised the theme of this lecture as follows :

"The fundamental cause of war is neither unjust treaties, nor racial or religious or cultural differences, nor mal-treatment of minorities, nor need of raw materials and markets, nor imperialist ambition, nor strategic considerations, nor those broad-shouldered scapegoats, capitalism or nationalism. The cause of war is the anarchy of sovereign states. The end of war throughout the world can come only through world federation. That is the theme of this remarkable lecture : "Pacifism is Not Enough, Nor Patriotism Either." "There is only one way of ending wars and of establishing peace in the political sense of the world, and that is by introducing into the international sphere the principle of the state, that is, by creating a federation of nations with a government which can wield the taxing, executive, legislative and judicial power, and command the exclusive allegiance of the individual in the supernational sphere." Pacifism is not enough, because justice in the international sphere, as elsewhere, is futile without force to back it. Patriotism is not enough, because selfish force, force except as the servant of justice, is self-destructive in the international sphere, as elsewhere."

That, however, is only the barest summary. In the lecture the theme is expounded with a force and reasonableness and economy of words, making it better worth reading than almost anything else that has been said about international problems. It should be read by everyone interested in these problems—and who is not interested ?

The same federal theme has been expounded forcibly in this country by Mr. Lionel Curtis, and in the United States by Mr. Clarence

K. Streit.¹ It raises an issue which must not be burked—as to whether international outlook and action can be achieved in an organisation built on purely national governments. It leads at the same time to a formidable dilemma, which arises as soon as one asks the question whether federal union means a federation of all the nations of the world or of some only.

Those who in the last years before the outbreak of the present war advocated a federal union of peoples, in place of a League of Nations, as the essential step for prevention of war, always proposed federations limited to countries with comparable economic standards and political institutions, in effect to democracies largely industrialised. The most widely known of these proposals, that of Mr. Clarence K. Streit in *Union Now* was for the federation of 15 democracies—the United States, the six self-governing States of the British Commonwealth and eight States of Western Europe.² Another proposal set out in even more concrete terms with a proposed constitution was made in 1940 by Mr. W. I. Jennings for a *Federation of Western Europe*.³

These proposals are well worth study, as an illustration of the problem to be solved and the difficulties and conditions of solving it. Either plan, shortly before this war, might have appeared just practicable and just sufficient to prevent war by setting up a force for peace strong enough to deter aggressors. Today the picture is different. The present war is even more of a world war than was that of 1914–18. Some of the largest forces in it—the Soviet Union and China—stand outside Mr. Streit's list. They cannot be left out of any organisation for world peace. Federation for world peace can only mean a federation of all the world.

Some who have written on the subject face this issue, and urge that the time has come for world federation. Thus Mr. R. M. MacIver in *Towards an Abiding Peace*⁴ proposes a world government with an Assembly of representatives elected directly by the component states; an International Executive of eleven members, representing great regional groups such as the United States, the British Commonwealth, Soviet Russia, India, Japan, and the Far East, and so forth; and an International Judiciary.

¹ Mr. Curtis' pamphlets, all published by the Oxford University Press, are *Decision*, 1941; *Action*, 1942; *Faith and Works*, 1943; and *The Way to Peace*, 1944. *Faith and Works*, reprinted in 1944 with an Introduction by myself, gives the most systematic account of Mr. Curtis' views; *The Way to Peace* deals mainly with questions put to him in discussion at a weekly Leave Course for men and women of the United Nations forces. Mr. Streit's volume on *Union Now* has been published in Britain by Jonathan Cape (1939). *The Case for Federal Union* is given in widely accessible form in a Penguin Special (published in 1939) by Mr. W. B. Curry.

² Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland.

³ Published under that title by the Cambridge University Press in 1940. Mr. Jennings, having in view the period after the war, included among the 13 to 15 states of his plan, a "democratised Germany."

⁴ MacMillan Company, New York 1943.

He contemplates that within its sphere the Assembly would make laws binding on all nations, to be interpreted by the Judiciary and enforced by the Executive. Another proposal of this character is made by Air Vice-Marshall Bennett in an article in the *Law Journal* of 30th December, 1944, in which he contemplates an "index of participation" in a Central International Authority, taking account of the "man-power, mentality and material" of each nation.

These proposals too, deserve study, and they rest in each case on compelling arguments for a fundamental change in the organisation of the world, if we desire security from war. But it is difficult to believe that projects of World Federation are practical as a solution of the imminent problem of today. The difficulty is not merely or even mainly that of getting agreement as to voting strength, persuading, for example, the British Commonwealth or the United States that they should count no more in a federal government than India or Japan and the Far East. The difficulty is that federation is practicable only between peoples of comparable political and economic institutions, in effect between "experienced democracies." That in so many words is the judgment of Mr. Lionel Curtis, the most distinguished living advocate of federal principles in Britain today. "Why do I think that a union for defence must begin with democracies and democracies only? If the union included an authoritarian state, the members sent to the union parliament from the state would not be elected by its citizens, but appointed by the authoritarian government. They would vote together in a block as ordered by their government. . . . The fate of governments would thus be determined by the government of one authoritarian state. . . . The fathers of the American Union in their wisdom provided against this danger, when they laid it down that only states founded on democracy might join the union."¹

Projects for federal union of what are now separate national states, in addition to the problem of what states are to be included, have to solve also the problem of what powers are to be transferred from the national governments to an international government. Mr. Streit and many others who have followed him on both sides of the Atlantic, feel it necessary to assign to the international government extensive economic functions—including the making of tariffs, free migration and a common currency. Mr. Lionel Curtis, recognising the difficulty of persuading nations to give up so much of their autonomy, proposes a much narrower sphere for the international government. His suggestion is "that the powers of the international government should be limited to defence, foreign policy, colonies, civil aviation and effective means of making the cost of these services a first charge on the nations united, leaving all internal and social affairs, including the incidence of taxation between one tax-payer and another, to the national governments where they now rest."² This

¹ *The Way to Peace*, pp. 61-63.

² *Faith and Works*, p. 41.

exclusion of direct economic functions from the scope of the international government is in accord with the conclusions reached here ; that the causes of war between powerful states are not directly economic and that under the rule of law the economic relations of separate nations can rest on free contract between them and need not be the subject of supernational control, like armaments and boundaries.

But however limited the scope of the international government, so long as it is built on federal lines, the fundamental instant dilemma remains. One horn of the dilemma is that world peace requires a world authority and that no authority can ensure peace unless it is so framed and so motivated that it will always subordinate the particular interest of each nation to the general interest of world order and will act promptly and decisively in defence of world order ; if the federalist criticism of the League of Nations, confirmed as it is by experience, is valid, we cannot be sure of getting an organisation which acts in this way, unless it is built on federal principles, with direct responsibility to the citizens, and not to national governments. The other horn of the dilemma is that world federation is impracticable, for federation must be based on democracy, and the world does not now consist, if it ever will consist, of "experienced democracies" ; any organisation for lasting peace throughout the world after this war must be an organisation which all nations can join, however they are governed internally, which from the outset Soviet Russia and China can join, which, therefore, cannot be federal. Here is the dilemma. The escape may be sought in two directions. We may seek to set up a world authority for peace on other than federal lines, or we may give up for the immediate future any idea of a world authority and plan regional groupings, which will guarantee peace within their particular regions if they cannot do so for all the world. The first of these alternatives is illustrated by the Tentative Proposals emerging from the Conversations on international affairs that were held at Dumbarton Oaks in August-October, 1944. The second is illustrated by Mr. Walter Lippmann's study of *U.S. War Aims*, one of the shortest and at the same time one of the most important books written of recent times on international problems.

THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS

Lord Lothian, in his Burge Memorial Lecture, recognising that world federation was remote, recognising and emphasising the dangers of return to the alliance system, suggested as the only possible way of escape from fresh disaster, a return to the underlying concept of the Peace Conference of 1919. "The League was to have a centre of gravity—the three victorious democracies—collectively so strong that no state could challenge their authority—even if they disarmed in a disarmed

world—yet so liberal that no one would fear them. . . . The underlying idea at Paris in 1919 was that the United States, France and the British Empire should collectively discharge through a League of Nations which gave representation to all peoples, the ultimate stabilising function which Great Britain alone had performed on the preceding century and in an even more liberal way.” This is the direction in which today we should seek escape, between the impracticability of world federation and the final disaster of continuing international anarchy, by building a world organisation in which equal rights for all nations great and small are guaranteed by the strength of the most powerful nations in lasting union for that purpose. If international relations in future are to rest not on force but on law, if the world is to be safe for small nations, as an ordered community is safe for the unarmed citizen, this must be by decision of those who are strong that they will be just. Justice must be the same for all. This does not mean that the task of supplying the force to maintain justice should be undertaken by all. In an ordered community all men enjoy the same liberties, but not all men are equally suited to be policemen. An ordered community does not recruit its police either from gangsters just out of prison and from those who are not strong enough for the task. The primary responsibility for world order must fall on those nations which can be strong and are prepared to be just.

This is the central idea underlying the Tentative Proposals which have emerged from the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations on World Organisation. The Conversations were held between officials of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China over a period of eight weeks from August to October, 1944. The Tentative Proposals resulting from them have been published as a White Paper,¹ and have been accompanied by an official Commentary by the British Government issued a few weeks later. The Proposals are merely a draft prepared jointly by officials and do not bind any of the Governments concerned. They leave unsettled also one vital question—the method of voting in the Security Council.² But as a first step to giving concrete form to aspirations for lasting peace and security, they deserve the most careful and sympathetic consideration.

The gist of the proposals lies in the establishment of a general International Organisation under the title of The United Nations, with a General Assembly in which all member States would be represented equally, and a Security Council in which five great Powers³ would hold permanently five out of eleven seats and on which the Charter setting up the organisation should confer “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

¹ Cmd. 6560, price 2d. The Commentary is Cmd. 6571, price 2d.

² See Appendix, pp. 103-04.

³ See

■ The purposes of the Organisation are set out in Chapter I of the Tentative Proposals, as follows :

(i) To maintain international peace and security ; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustments or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace ;

(ii) To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ;

(iii) To achieve international co-operation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems ; and

(iv) To afford a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

These Purposes are to be pursued in accord with principles set out in Chapter II, of which the most important are as follows :

(i) The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States.

* * * * *

(iii) All members of the Organisation shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

(iv) All members of the Organisation shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation.

Membership of the Organisation is described as "open to all peace-loving States." But the Organisation should ensure "that States not members of the Organisation act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." The principles are to be made binding on all the world. Moreover, though membership is voluntary in the first instance, "States would have no right of withdrawing voluntarily ; the intention is that membership of the Organisation shall be permanent." ¹

The pivot of the whole scheme is obviously the Security Council which would be empowered "to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute" and failing settlement by agreement between the parties concerned "to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." If failure to settle a dispute voluntarily or by procedure recommended by the Council appears to threaten peace or security, the Council "should take any measures necessary," including both economic and military sanctions. All armed forces would remain national, but each member of the organisation would undertake to make available to the Security Council an agreed

quota of armed forces, and the Council, in making and executing plans involving the use of these forces, would be assisted by a Military Staff Committee "composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives." In effect decision on any dispute which was not referred to the International Court of Justice as "justiciable" would be made by the Security Council, and enforcement of all decisions, by military measures if necessary, would rest with the Council.

Many questions may be raised as to particular points in the Tentative Proposals. One is as to the name proposed for the Organisation: "The United Nations." This name, in the words of the Commentary, both shows that the Organisation "is a result of the common effort which has saved civilisation from the Nazi and Fascist attacks and expresses the belief that such a close union will continue in the future."¹ Against this it can be argued that an Organisation for World Peace cannot be complete until it embraces all nations, including those who have been enemies of the United Nations of the War; we want a continuance of the common effort of war but not a continuance of the division of the world.

Another important question related to the distinction between "justiciable" and other disputes. As the Proposals stand, it would be for the Security Council to decide whether or not a dispute was "justiciable" so that it went to the International Court of Justice, and it would be for the Security Council to give the decision on all other disputes subject only to its power of obtaining advice on legal points from the International Court of Justice. The term "justiciable" is not explained either in the Tentative Proposals or in the Commentary. Yet its meaning is far from self-evident. It is more than doubtful whether the Security Council which is an executive organ, consisting of representatives of particular States of varying strength each with special interests of their own, is a suitable body for making such decisions. The condition of peace with justice between nations is that all disputes should be settled impartially. The nature of the tribunal and the terms of reference to it may differ according to the nature of the dispute. Some authorities have proposed tribunals of two kinds; a Court of Law for interpretation of international rights and duties as they stand, and an "Equity Tribunal" with wider powers involving change of legal rights. But the essential feature about any tribunal is that it should be disinterested, not consisting of representatives of particular interests. Though there may be reasons, as suggested below,² for leaving the last word on certain issues with the Security Council, that word should be spoken only after an expert examination of the issue by an impartial tribunal and in the light of any report that the tribunal may make.

Another still more important question relates to armament and disarmament. The assumption underlying the Tentative Proposals is that all armed forces continue to be national. Yet the whole purpose of the proposals fails if these national arms are ever used for a national purpose. And though the members of the Organisation pledge themselves formally to refrain from the use or threat of force, except for the purposes of the Organisation, each of them is left free to build up what armed force it wills. It is true that, as the fifth of its principal functions and powers, it is referred to the Security Council to make proposals for the regulation of armaments.

In order to promote the establishment of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the military Staff Committee—should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organisation.

On this two comments may fairly be made: (1) that the main reason for regulating armaments is not desire to avoid the expense of maintaining them in peace but the certainty that if they are not regulated, there will sooner or later be competition in armaments bringing back mutual fear to the world and with fear the seed of war: (2) that there is no obligation of individual members of the Organisation to accept whatever proposals may be made by the Security Council for the regulation of armaments.

Behind all these important particular problems lies the main problem of confidence in the intentions of the Great Powers which are bound to dominate the Security Council. "The Powers to be conferred on the Security Council," as is pointed out in the Commentary, "are greater than have ever before been given to an international body. But . . . the Security Council must act only in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Organisation." Those principles include the "sovereign equality" of States which in the words of the Commentary means that "The first criterion for action is. . . not power, but the equal rights of all States to the maintenance of their political independence" (§ 15). They include refraining from use or threat of force for any national purpose, subject only to right of self-defence by a State attacked suddenly by another State, though even here, as the Commentary points out, "the Organisation would have power to intervene immediately and to determine whether the right of self-defence has been properly used." (§ 17). They include the obligation of all member States to supply armed force according to their strength for the maintenance of world order. While protecting each State against arbitrary action by any other State, the Organisation in the words of the Commentary "does not involve the

possibility of change of frontiers and of other changes after consideration by the Organisation.

These are all admirable statements of principle. If the Security Council always acts on them, if the Great Powers who are destined to dominate the Security Council can give confidence that they will always act on these principles themselves, the problem of world order is solved. How can the Great Powers give confidence that they will act in accord with the principles laid down at Dumbarton Oaks? The answer is that they can give this confidence not by their professions but by their acts. Not by signing Atlantic Charters and making general declarations of sovereign equality of all nations, but by accepting equality in practice, can the Great Powers convince the World of their good faith.

Here lies the significance of the unsettled issue as to how the Security Council should reach its decisions. The Tentative Proposals under the head of "Voting" leave a gap, with a note: "The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration." It is understood that one at least of the Great Powers desired to make decisions of the Security Council require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members. Such a provision, giving to each Great Power an individual veto on any action by the Council, would clearly make power rather than political independence of States the first criterion of action, and would claim for the Great Powers a position of privilege inconsistent with their professions.¹

Here lies the significance of the dispute as to boundaries between Soviet Russia and Poland. It is probable that an impartial tribunal with no interest save that of securing lasting peace in the world, would decide to give everything east of the Curzon line to Soviet Russia, and to give East Prussia and Danzig to Poland, with mass transfers of populations as the best solution of this tangled problem. It is possible, though not without misgiving, to acquiesce in the procedure actually adopted by the three Great Powers of deciding on this or something like it, not after fresh impartial consideration, but as part of the process of conducting war, at a Conference in which one of the disputants took part,² while the other was unrepresented. But it is idle to regard such procedure as a good augury for the future. Having made this decision, the Great Powers, one and all, have to win back confidence in their intentions by making it clear that within her new boundaries Poland will be completely independent, choosing her own Government in form and in substance.

¹ As these pages were passing through the press, the gap in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was filled by the announcement on 5th March, 1945, of the plan for voting in the Security Council agreed by the three Great Powers at the Crimea Conference. My view of this Plan is given briefly in a letter appearing in the *Times* on 7th March, and printed below in the Appendix, p. 103.

Here lies the significance of the undertaking of peace-loving powers, like the United States, to go to war for the enforcement of international justice. So long as the individual citizen doubts whether the policeman will protect him, he will feel bound to carry arms for his own protection, and when all individual citizens carry arms, sooner or later through mutual fear shooting will start. The United States has a fine record of peaceable settlement of its own disputes¹ and has had many powerful advocates of a Court of International Justice. But Justice needs a policeman as well as a judge and it needs a policeman on whose help one can rely. On the day that it is clear, with full constitutional authority, that the United States is committed according to its strength to take its full share in policing the world a new era of human happiness will open.

Here finally lies the significance of the colonial problem. The charge brought against Britain by Germany and her associates is that, having acquired a large proportion of the best portions of the world by force in the past, she now seeks to make her advantage permanent by setting up an international organisation for preserving the *status quo*. A practical answer to the charge is provided by the practice of Britain, both in regard to the Dominions, which have become wholly self-governing, and in regard to the colonies, in which the idea of trusteeship in administration for the benefit of the inhabitants rather than of the administering power has become steadily more important. It would be little sacrifice in substance formally to recognise this position and accept the obligation of satisfying an impartial authority that the principle of trusteeship was being carried out completely and without reservation in every colony in the world.

To stress the peculiar responsibility that now and in the immediate future rests on these three Great Powers—Soviet Russia, the United States, and the British Commonwealth—is not to belittle any other Power, whether, like China and France, it is designated as a permanent member of the Security Council, or whether it is not so designated. This peculiar responsibility of the moment arises from the fact that each of these three Great Powers is in a position to perpetuate international anarchy, and that each of them is also in a position to make or to refuse a contribution to the happiness of mankind so great that it may be decisive. Each of the three Great Powers has the opportunity and the responsibility of making its contribution to confidence in its intentions. The Tentative Proposals from Dumbarton Oaks provide machinery for the

¹ In the *League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (Macmillan, 1939), p. 108 *n* Professor Zimmern cites the following figures as to use of international arbitration between 1794 and 1914 :—

Great Britain	..	71	Germany	..	15
U.S.A.	..	69	Russia	..	3
France	..	33	Austria	..	2

maintenance of peace and security. Whether or not that machinery will serve its purpose or any good purpose depends on the spirit in which it is operated. If all the Great Powers are really now prepared to be just as well as strong, lasting peace can be established throughout the world. If they or any of them are not in substance prepared for this, if it proves impracticable to establish a world organisation capable of ensuring peace with justice throughout the world, and of winning the confidence of all nations, great and small, we are driven to the other alternative, of regional groupings, illustrated here from the writings of Mr. Walter Lippmann.

THE PRESCRIPTION OF MR. LIPPMANN

Mr. Lippmann's study of *U.S. War Aims*,¹ like its predecessor *U.S. Foreign Policy*,² is addressed primarily to his own people. The author's first object in both books is to expose the danger and folly of isolationism, to show that defence of Western Europe with Britain and of Eastern Asia with China are vital American interests. "In the American view, as it has been applied in two wars with Germany and one with Japan, the evil which must be resisted has been the conquest of our neighbours in the surrounding oceans. . . Within the region of the world which fronts upon the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the United States is the enemy of all conquerors and the partisan of national freedom" (p. 28). This vital interest of the United States in what happens on the other side of the Atlantic and the Pacific has in fact been recognised in three wars by the American people. Mr. Lippmann's point is that it has not been recognised in practice till the time for action was nearly past, till Britain was in mortal danger, till China was almost strangled. "From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1942, this country was in greater peril from more formidable enemies than it has ever been before. While we debated whether we wished to be isolated from our allies, we were in mortal danger of being isolated by our enemies" (p. 35).

Mr. Lippmann's first object is by combating isolationism, to save his country "from drifting into another such terrible predicament." His second object is to oppose any attempt now to set up a world authority for world order. This opposition rests on arguments of two kinds, one general and permanent, one related to the circumstances of today. The general argument is that the diversity of national states and of their

¹ Published in Britain by Hamish Hamilton. The Preface to the British Edition is dated 28th July, 1944.

² An English edition with an Introduction by D. W. Brogan has been published by Hamish Hamilton. (August, 1943). In this earlier book Mr. Lippmann takes a somewhat different line from that of his later book on *U.S. War Aims*, holding that the possibility of world-order lies in the perpetuation of the "nuclear alliance" between the United States, Britain and Russia.

regional interests dooms to failure any attempt to set up again a world association of nations deciding matters by vote, to recreate a new and stronger League of Nations on Wilsonian principles. The nature of the arguments is given best by an illustration. "Let us ask ourselves . . . whether we believe that a dispute between the United States and the Republic of Panama should be settled "collectively" by an assembly of mankind The Panamanian question would then be in the same pot with, let us say, the Burmese, the Lebanese, the Persian, the Outer Mongolian questions. How China voted about Panama might then depend on how we voted about Burma" (pp. 117-118). In other words the diversity of regional interests makes any system of world government which ignores this diversity into the prey of "log-rolling." While Mr. Lippmann's general argument against attempts to set up a world authority is based on the enduring geographical diversity of States, his special argument is based on the diversity, which may or may not endure, between their political institutions, and particularly on the difference between the institutions of one of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union—and those of the United States or Britain.

"The Soviet Union's relations with the United States, and indeed with all other European and American countries are beset by profound contradictions which inhibit confident collaboration The Soviet Government maintains a quarantine against free intercourse with us. The outgoing censorship permits us to know about Russia only what the government deems expedient. The incoming censorship permits the Russian people to know about us, even about our official acts, only what the Soviet government deems expedient. Within the United States citizens may oppose the Administration on a policy dealing with Russia, and if they can muster enough popular support, the policy, or even the Administration, can be changed. But on a Soviet policy towards the United States there is no appeal from the decisions of the government."

"The Soviet quarantine means that in foreign affairs the Soviet government can use secrecy and surprise to manoeuvre in ways which democratic governments cannot do. Our institutions are such that we could not, without destroying them, equalize intercourse by establishing our own quarantine. Unlike the Soviet's our policies can be formed only after deliberation and debate which put the whole world on notice."

"We owe it to the Soviet people to say that however correct may be our diplomatic relations, they will not really be the good relations they need to be, until the basic political and human liberties are established in the Soviet Union. . . . For between States that do not have free institutions and those that do have them, international relations must necessarily be special and restricted. . . . The world order cannot be half democratic and half totalitarian" (pp. 90-1).

The argument given above¹ against attempting world federation

of democratic and totalitarian states is held by Mr. Lippmann to bar systematic collaboration between them in a world organisation. His positive conclusion is that, in place of attempting to set up any world-wide organisation now, we should contemplate the division of the world into three or four great regional groups, guaranteeing peace within each region and, so far as possible, leaving each other alone. The largest and most definite of these regional groups would be the "Atlantic Community" comprising both the Americas, the British Commonwealth and Western Europe, including a democratic de-militarised Germany; war within this region must become unthinkable, war beyond it and in defence of it must be a combined operation (p. 42). The second group is the "Russian Orbit," meaning everything from Prague to Vladivostok, a region dominated completely by the Soviet Union. Beyond these Mr. Lippmann sees a "Chinese Orbit," and in due course an "Indian Orbit." The essence of Mr. Lippmann's conception is that none of these great regional groups should interfere with another group or take any responsibility for what happens within it. "If the Atlantic Community or any individual member of it, say Great Britain or France, made an alliance—which was not open to the Soviet Union or not made with its consent. . . with any state within the Russian Orbit, say Poland, the event would be the certain sign that the structure of the peace had been fatally broken" (p. 82). Again, the United States can take no responsibility for China in relation to the Soviet Union; along the vast unsettled land border between the Russian and the Chinese Orbits there is, as Mr. Lippmann fully recognises, the material for many disputes leading to war, but the United States can take no part or responsibility here, for this border is beyond her reach (p. 97). Mr. Lippmann will have nothing to do either with the ostrich isolationism of America's past or with what he regards as the visionary dreams of world order that led to the League of Nations. He desires America to take her proper responsibilities in the World, but to undertake no responsibilities where she cannot follow words by effective action. In the past "no other nation in modern times has preached so much about, or has passed so many other judgments upon, the affairs of so many other people" (p. 22).

Mr. Lippmann wishes the United States in future to be in the world effectively, with a limited liability. His prescription is regionalism. On this prescription three comments may be made,

First, regionalism does not secure world peace. Within three possibly out of the four regions, that is to say everywhere outside the Atlantic Community, peace will be secured only by the domination of one State to which other States may submit most unwillingly. Between the regional groups there is no machinery for settling disputes, save the old machinery of diplomacy, alliances and power politics. All this may only prepare the way for colossal conflict. If war between the "Russian

Orbit" and the "Chinese Orbit," arising out of their unsettled boundaries, should end in the domination of all Eastern Asia by one of the two, the United States might be exposed to a renewal of the dangers which she had escaped by defeat of Japan. Mr. Lippmann's prescription is a perpetuation of the methods of spheres of influence and alliances which are condemned by other leaders of American opinion.¹

Second, Mr. Lippmann's criticism of voting by a world assembly as a means of deciding particular disputes, is in line with the objection made above² to decisions on disputes being pronounced by the Security Council, whatever the system of voting. But it does not apply to proposals to settle disputes by the arbitration of an impartial disinterested tribunal, as an alternative to settling them by the force of the disputants.

Third, the proposed structure of the "Atlantic Community," is nowhere explained. For war within the community to become unthinkable there must be machinery for settling disputes. For war in defence of the Community and every one of its members to become in every case a combined operation, there must be machinery for continuous previous consultation. The "Atlantic Community" cannot be a reality without a structure. Mr. Lippmann's vagueness on this point may be diplomatic, dictated by desire to avoid alarming those of his own people who still fear entanglements with other nations. But it would probably be better to face the issue boldly. The "Atlantic Community" seems unlikely to perform the services required of it in Mr. Lippmann's scheme without becoming a Confederation on the way to Federation.

In the light of these comments it is difficult to accept Mr. Lippmann's prescription as sufficient. Regional arrangements within the framework of a world organisation may have much to commend them. Regional arrangements without any world organisation are a poor second best. But these comments do not detract in any way from recognition of the great service that Mr. Lippmann has rendered, to the world as to his own people, in stressing the vital community of interest between all members of the "Atlantic Community," and in showing that foreign policy must consist not of words only but must be related to one's power and one's readiness to use it. It may be hoped that on these points he will carry conviction on both sides of the Atlantic.

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION ON ALL DISPUTES

From this review of alternative plans for the future of international relations two main conclusions emerge. First, the attempt to establish

¹ See *Statement of United States Foreign Policy* by Mr. Cordell Hull on 21st March, 1944, printed below in the Appendix (p. 94).

² p. 71.

world-wide order on a uniform plan, not merely order in particular regions, is necessary and is worth making. Mr. Lippmann's argument against deciding international issues by voting does not apply against deciding them by arbitration. His argument from the diversity of political institutions is decisive against attempts to set up a world government by federation but not against establishing and enforcing justice between nations; a totalitarian State and a democratic State cannot join in a Parliament, but they can equally accept the rule of law in their relations to one another and to other States. The attempt to set up a world order is necessary, because the possible renewal of war is a disaster not to be contemplated. The attempt to set up a world-order is worth making, because such an order does not involve sacrifice of anything that any nation should regard as a vital interest. "Whether we like it or not, the planet is becoming a single community in spite of all its varieties of climate, race and culture."¹ That was proved in the economic sphere by the world depression of 1929-32. It has been proved in the political sphere by the renewed World War in 1939.

Second, abolition of war cannot be attained by negative means, by merely renouncing or prohibiting war. It depends on finding a positive alternative to war as a means of settling disputes between nations. The only alternative method which can be world-wide is compulsory arbitration by an impartial tribunal applied to all disputes and backed by overwhelming force.

This alternative method can be developed from the Tentative Proposals framed at Dumbarton Oaks, provided that it is made clear:

- (a) that all disputes and not merely "justiciable" disputes will be referred to an impartial tribunal.
- (b) that the Great Powers in the Security Council will accept arbitration in their own case, being content to be policemen without being judges also and without being above the law.
- (c) that the rights of each nation will not depend on the scale of its national armaments or in its alliances.

Reference of all disputes between nations to arbitration does not mean that every dispute, whatever its character, goes to the same tribunal. There may be different tribunals of differing composition and terms of reference to deal with the various types of issue that may arise. Thus there may be a Boundary Commission for boundary disputes, with a developing technique of plebiscites for ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants. There may be a Colonial Commission for ensuring that the principle of trusteeship, as set out above, is observed by the administering power in regard to all colonies: it may be found convenient for this Commission to be divided into Regional Committees for different parts of the earth.

¹ Harold Butler: *The Lost Peace*, p. 25.

There will naturally be a Court of Justice for interpretation of international law and of treaties of all kinds.

Reference of all disputes to arbitration does not mean, again, that the World Organisation for Peace can consist simply of a series of arbitration tribunals. It must, as suggested in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, have an Assembly for general consultation and conciliation, and an Economic Council for advice on all economic problems and for development of that economic collaboration on which lasting peace may, in the last resort, depend. It must have a Security Council with the two executive functions of enforcing arbitral decisions if force is needed, and of ensuring the security and independence of each national State which undertakes to accept arbitration and guarantees to all persons living within its boundaries the basic human liberties.

Reference of all disputes to an impartial tribunal may not mean, finally, that the powers of the tribunal are just the same in regard to every dispute. Some of those who desire to see justice substituted for self-regarding force in every international dispute, hold, nevertheless, that a distinction must be drawn between "justiciable" and other disputes. There are some matters on which a tribunal of impartial judges should be empowered to give a final judgment. There are other matters, they hold, on which the finding of the tribunal should require confirmation by the body that will become responsible for using force to give effect to it, that is to say, in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the Security Council. In other words, the tribunals of impartial persons would in some cases give final judicial decisions, and in other cases would make recommendations only. There is practical force in this argument. What is essential is that no dispute should be dealt with by a Security Council of national representatives except after previous reference to an expert impartial tribunal for investigation; that in any decision of the Security Council an interested party should take no part; that the voting procedure of the Security Council should not allow it to become, in form or in substance, an organ of dictatorship by the Great Powers.

It is needless here to set out in detail the whole structure of world-order. It is sufficient to name its foundation. The fundamental condition of lasting peace is acceptance and enforcement of arbitration in all disputes between nations which cannot be settled by agreement. This involves the setting up of super-national tribunals for arbitration and an executive authority for enforcing the decisions of the tribunals if force is needed. It does not involve the setting up of anything that can be described fairly as a World-State. It would increase rather than diminish the enjoyment of political independence by states, freeing them, one and all, great and small, from fear, from the burden of armaments, from the entanglements of mutual dependence and alliances.

Acceptance and enforcement of compulsory arbitration is the way

of escape from the federalist dilemma. World-peace cannot be ensured by regional federations, since these by their nature are not world-wide. World-peace cannot in the foreseeable future be ensured by world-federation, since this is impracticable till all the nations of the world have become experienced democracies. But world-peace can be obtained if the nations are prepared to accept arbitration in place of war as the final determinant of all disputes. There is no reason why all nations should not accept this now, whatever their political institutions. There is every reason why they should accept it formally and finally. It is to the interest of every nation to adopt arbitration as the positive alternative to war.

(a) because so long as war is permissible, every nation will feel bound to prepare for war by constructing armaments, and sooner or later mutual fear bred by armaments will lead to actual war ;

(b) because the issues arising between nations are limited in number and scope and leaving them to settlement by an impartial tribunal under appropriate terms of reference will not affect the independence of nations in internal affairs, any more than the present practice of leaving issues to be settled by war affects independence between wars ;

(c) because war today with modern industrial and political techniques is an evil of a different character from earlier wars, affecting the whole people, involving continuous organisation during peace, threatening lasting servitude to the defeated.

It may be said that, even if all nations formally accept the obligation to arbitrate and to enforce arbitration, and set up an organisation to give effect to this, there can be no assurance, while they remain separate nations, that they will always honour their obligations. It may be argued, accordingly, that full federation setting up a world-state is the only guarantee of world-peace. The answer to this is two-fold. First, federation itself, as was shown by the experience of the United States of America in 1860 is not an absolute guarantee of peace ; it can be broken by civil war. Second, even if all the nations were now set on lasting peace as the greatest good for every one of them, they could not get it by the road of world-federation, because federation is impracticable between national states of utterly diverse political institutions. On the other hand, if all the larger nations of the world were now set on lasting peace as the greatest good for each of them, they could get this by the road of compulsory arbitration, which is open to one-party states, and to democracies alike. The world organisation for peace tomorrow can be built on compulsory arbitration and cannot be built on federal lines.

It does not follow that federal union of what are now separate national states may not be of value in shaping world order. I believe myself that such federations can increase materially the happiness of mankind, by making it more united. Mr. Lionel Curtis, while recognising the need

of a world organisation which cannot be federal, advocates federation of the States of the British Commonwealth and the democracies of Western Europe, as a precedent that might lead to federation with the United States. Undoubtedly a federation of Western Europe including Britain and the Commonwealth would be a power both formidable to potential aggressors and in itself completely pacific ; the diversity of nations within it would make it certain that it would never pursue an aggressive aim of any one of them. Undoubtedly a federation of Western Europe, the British Commonwealth and the United States, if it could be accomplished, would change beneficently the political climate of the world. Such a federation, by its size and variety of interests as well as by the traditions of its main constituents, would be essentially pacific and at the same time strong enough to guarantee order over most of the world. But all projects of regional federation, however good in themselves, must be considered also from the point of view of whether they would hinder or contribute to the making of an authority of even wider scope. The first aim must be to establish peace with justice throughout the world, for peace may well prove to be indivisible.

The suggestion made here, that the world-order of tomorrow must be built on compulsory arbitration of all disputes is not put forward as something new. It has been the central theme of many who have written on international relations ; it was the basis of the Geneva Protocol.¹ What has been attempted here is to argue from a review of the issues between nations, that acceptance of arbitration represents no undesirable sacrifice of political independence or of its own way of life for each national community, that the price of peace is not so great as many have thought. What has been done for all the world by the bitter experience of two wars, is to show that the price which it is worth while to pay for peace is higher than ever before.

¹ See Jordan *op. cit.*, p. 206. In Britain advocacy of an Equity Tribunal for arbitrating on all disputes which can not be settled by legal interpretation, combined with an international police force for ensuring that the decisions are observed, forms the central aim of the New Commonwealth Society, founded by the late Lord Davies.

PEACE WORTH ITS PRICE

THE JUDGMENT OF THE GREAT POWERS

The price of peace is two-fold-political and economic. We must,—make as certain as we can that differences between nations cannot lead to war; that means as a first objective the setting up of an acceptable alternative to war for deciding when nations differ. We must then go on to diminish the occasions of difference. The machinery for arbitration in disputes, however well devised in itself, may fail, if it is exposed to excessive strains. Once the pursuit of power for national ends has been made needless and futile, the greatest strains between nations are likely to arise from economic causes; envy, enmity and disputes spring from poverty, unemployment and glaring inequality. There follows, as a second objective, international economic collaboration for higher standards of life in all countries. The first, the political, part of the price of peace has to be paid at once and is far the greater part. In asking today whether peace is worth its price, it will be sufficient to look at this alone. If that is paid, the rest will follow.

The price of peace that must be paid here and now is acceptance and enforcement of impartial arbitration in all disputes between nations, subject to the safeguards and by the machinery suggested above. Is this price one that various nations of the world are likely to be ready to pay?

The answer that would be given by the overwhelming majority of the separate nations of the world, that is to say all the small nations, is certain. They would welcome impartial arbitration on all disputes, because under international anarchy they exist only by the toleration or protection of their stronger neighbours. The critical question is as to the prospective attitude of the stronger nations, above all of the British Commonwealth, the United States of America and Soviet Russia.

Let us begin with the British, in Britain and overseas. Is there anything in the obligations of the rule of law as set out above that British people would reject? They are practical people with a strong sense of justice and tolerance, a resolute individualism, a century-old practice of self-government, and a good conceit of themselves. It is hard to believe that practical people with a sense of justice would attach vital importance to the legal concept of absolute sovereignty, would be prepared to fight for international anarchy. On the other hand, neither the British nor any other people with a good conceit of themselves and the practice of self-government would be likely to accept the constitution of a World State and World Parliament. But this is not involved in the obligations of the rule

of law. Would the British people be prepared to accept the finding of an independent Boundary Commission that some part of the world hitherto administered from Britain should be transferred to some other State? In answering that question, it is essential to remember the conditions on which alone such a transfer could be made. It could not affect bases, held to be essential for the policing of the world: while any need for force remains in the world, the control of Gibraltar cannot depend on the wishes of the people who live there, and cannot be allowed to pass into weak hands. Transfer could not anywhere else take place except in accord with the wishes of the inhabitants. If the inhabitants of some part of the world of no strategic importance wished to leave the British Empire, would the British fight to prevent them? Obviously not. The answer has already been given historically—in the development of the British Commonwealth of free sovereign nations, with South Africa and Eire as critical examples, in the cession of the Ionian Islands, in the attitude of a large part of the British people, as distinct from George III, to the North American Colonies, a hundred and fifty years ago. Equally it is clear that the British people would not reject making formal the principle of trusteeship in respect of all colonial possessions. That is the conception to which they have been moving. They would object to the passing of colonies into the hands of some other power, which might use them for preparation of war or interfere with freedom of trade. But that is not the proposition made here. Would the British people accept the binding character of economic treaties freely made by them with provision for arbitration on any dispute? The answer is that they would, as a matter of course. Would the British people accept the obligations of a charter of passive human rights, guaranteeing the rule of law between citizens. The answer is that very largely they are the inventors of practical methods of securing the liberty of the citizen from arbitrary power. The price of peace as it is set out here is one which beyond reasonable doubt the British people would be prepared to pay.

What of the United States? That is for the American people to say. But the omens are favourable. The United States has always taken a leading part in seeking to establish organs for international justice and for arbitration in international disputes. The leaders of American opinion appear to see now, as clearly as any, that justice needs a sword as well as scales. "Some international agency must be created which can—by force if necessary—keep the peace among nations in the future"; this is one of the points of United States Foreign Policy most emphatically laid down by Mr. Cordell Hull in March, 1944. Mr. Lippmann's underlying reason for limiting America's responsibilities to the "Atlantic Community" is the view that only within the region of that Community can her force be effective. The House of Representative on 21st September, 1943, passed by 360 votes to 29 the Fulbright Resolution calling for "the

creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world and as favouring participation by the United States therein by its constitutional processes." The Senate on 5th November, 1943, passed in equally overwhelming fashion, by 85 to 5, the Connally Resolution approving among other things the Moscow Declaration "for a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security." The elections of November, 1944, resulted not only in the return of President Roosevelt, but in the defeat of some of the most prominent isolationists of both parties, in both parts of Congress.

What of Soviet Russia? One can only wait on events, but one may wait hopefully. If some of the recent developments—in respect of Poland and in the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks—give ground for apprehension, the broad fact remains that the Government of Soviet Russia, though not democratic in the American or British sense, has stood for the interest of the common people. The greatest interest of the common people in all lands is peace; war is fun only for dictators. And the war in which Soviet Russia has been engaged against Germany has shown at least that the leaders of Soviet Russia can count on the unwavering support of their people. The issues of Boundaries and Colonies should present no difficulties to a Federation which, like the Soviet Union, acknowledges the right of secession of any of its members, and disclaims colonial ambitions. It is right to hope that Soviet Russia, which has sprung so glorious a surprise on the world by her capacity to make war, will be equally capable of defeating croakers and critics by joining to make a lasting peace, based on the declarations to which she has been a party, making the world safe for all nations great and small, using her strength not tyrannously as a giant but as a trust for humanity.

THE REGIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO WORLD ORDER

If this does not happen, if through the attitude of Soviet Russia or for any other reason, world-wide order and peace based on justice seem for the present unobtainable, the time will have come for regional arrangements.

The problem of international justice discussed here is in some ways similar to the problem of international trade discussed in Part VI. of my Report on Full Employment in a Free Society. The first object in planning international trade should be to establish a system by which all nations of the world may trade freely and equally together without discrimination between them. But if it is not possible to establish international trade on an uncontrolled multilateral basis, so devised that it may be

expected to continue permanently to common advantage, then sooner than establish a world-wide system that is doomed to failure and disappointment, it is better, in regard to international trade, to establish it on a regional basis, within which international co-operation can be permanent and guaranteed. So in regard to organisation for peace, the first aim and the only one that will guarantee peace throughout the world is to establish a World Organisation for Peace, which makes it certain that all disputes between nations will be determined peaceably on the merits of the dispute and not by the relative strengths of the nations, through use or threat of national force. But a world organisation can guarantee world peace only if it is based on universal acceptance of the rule of law over all nations. If it becomes clear that the rule of law cannot at once be established between all nations, then it must be established between those nations that will accept it, then we must be content at the outset with something less than world order.

The "Atlantic Community" desired by Mr. Lippmann, with war between its members unthinkable, with war in defence of any of its members always a combined operation, is not a substitute for world-order. It is only a second-best, if world-wide peace based on justice cannot be obtained. But neither is the Atlantic Community an obstacle to world-order. By the variety of its constituents and of their interests, other than the general interest of peace with justice, the Atlantic Community would be incapable of aggression, whatever its structure. If, despite all efforts, a world-wide organisation for peace cannot be brought to birth at once, we need not despair. We are bound all the more to proceed with a regional organisation and can do so in hope that it may lead us to the wider aim.

The first aim in planning the organisation of the world after the war is to make it as certain as we can that the United States, Soviet Russia and the British Commonwealth, should always keep together in a union, not for world domination, but for world order and for the security of small nations as well as large nations. If that aim cannot be realised, then it is even more necessary that the United States and the British Commonwealth should keep together. A Federal Union is the most certain guarantee of that, and cannot be dismissed as impracticable; in terms of time for travel nearly all parts of Mr. Lippmann's Atlantic Community are nearer to one another now than were the thirteen American States which came together in 1787; since that date the federal principle has been extended and tested, and abundant experience of its application has been acquired. But formal federation is not indispensable. With the mentality of the American and British peoples it may be possible and easier for them to work together with less formal bonds, but no less certainly and speedily; this, however, can happen only if the minds of these peoples are set that way. The text that should become graven on the heart of every American

citizen and every British citizen is that on the day that we Americans and Britons separate we shall have lost the peace, we shall have shed our blood together in the four quarters of the world in vain. Let those in either country who for any reason seek to spread suspicion, envy or discord between these two great communities of free men be known henceforth for what they are—the ignorant, petulant or malevolent enemies of mankind.

OUR SECOND CHANCE

Through the coming victory of the United Nations, by the heroism and sacrifice of countless millions, humanity today is on the point of being given a second chance, to do that which some only attempted in 1919, to banish war and fear of war from the world. The first condition of taking this second chance is that the nations of the world should realise that freedom from war and from fear of war is the greatest of all their interests. The second condition is that willing this as the supreme end, they should be ready to will the means. The third condition is that at this revolutionary moment in the world's history we should be ready to be bold. We must not be put off with half measures again.

It is not enough to aim at abolishing war for some generations. This may well mean that war returns, as it did this time, within one generation. For so long as war seems possible, preparations for war will be made, and preparations will lead to war. The self-styled realists who deride as Utopian plans for abolition of war are the idlest of bad dreamers, men who shut their eyes to the realities of total war. The shadow of total war has lain over the world for thirty years, for long enough to let all men see what it means. The choice is no longer between Utopia and the world that our fathers knew. The choice is between Utopia and Hell. The choice is at hand.

When fighting against Germany and Japan ends in unconditional surrender, the effective power in the world will rest with three great confederations—the United States, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth. On how they exercise that power of the moment depends the future of the world. "When at the end of this conflict, those nations which claim to believe in international justice have also acquired dominant force, they must prove their claim by their behaviour. They must decide in principle that force—their force—in the international sphere shall be used only as the servant of justice; they must follow that principle unswervingly to its practical conclusion. This means, in the last analysis, that the force wielded by any nation must not be used to gain economic advantage for the citizens of that nation over the citizens of any other country. The only force in the world must be force acting as a policeman. It will be just and necessary, when the time comes, to deny arms to nations

which have shown that they cannot be trusted with arms. It will only be just or a means to lasting peace to do this if those nations which keep arms in their hands show that they can be trusted to refrain from using arms for purely national ends.”¹ “The whole history of the world is summed up in the fact that when nations are strong they are not always just, and when they wish to be just they are often no longer strong. . . . Let us have this blessed union of power and of justice.”² Let us have it at that moment.

If three Great Powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the British Commonwealth at that moment desire to lay the foundation of universal lasting peace with justice, they can do so. If lasting peace is not then secured throughout the world, it will be because one or more of those three Great Powers has not learned sufficiently the lessons of the past. Nothing worth having can be had for nothing. The condition of peace is that the strong nations of the world, at the moment of overwhelming strength, should decide to be just, should make and keep the world safe for small nations and so for all nations ; should establish the rule of law—setting up a world organisation for declaring, enforcing, and revising law between nations ; should say that never again will mass-killing in pursuance of a national aim be practised by themselves or be permitted by them to others. The leaders who lead their peoples to this decision and the peoples who follow them will change the history of mankind as it has never been changed before, and will live forever in the grateful memories of untold generations.

We who dwell in Britain cannot by ourselves achieve peace for ourselves ; still less can we do this for other nations. No nation can be safe by its own arms. The establishing of the world-wide rule of law is a task for many nations. But we who live in Britain can make our contribution to this common task, by making it plain beyond questioning that we desire peace with justice for all nations, that we know the price of peace and are prepared to pay it, that we will accept impartial justice in our cause and will to the full measure of our strength contribute to ensuring it for others. If we make that plain, we shall rally to our purpose the conscience of humanity.

We who are living now cannot ensure peace for ever, because we shall not live for ever. We cannot prevent our descendants from indulging in mass-murder, by explosive, by flame, by famine and by gas, if they are wicked enough or foolish enough to do so. We who live now are in charge of the present, not of the future. But we can avoid so shaping the present as to make war inevitable or nearly inevitable, unless our descendants are infinitely wiser than ourselves. We can avoid leaving to our children and

¹ These words are from my Preface to the reprint in 1941 of *Pacifism is Not Enough (nor Patriotism Either)*, by Lord Lothian (Oxford University Press).

² Churchill, *Arms and the Covenant*, p. 301, March, 1936.

their children a world in which the seeds of war lie waiting in the soil of war to grow their deadly fruit. The soil of war in international anarchy. The seeds of war are fear, revenge, ambition. To put an end to fear among nations we must establish and enforce equal law among all nations great and small. To plant no seed of revenge, we must make a just peace, with no lasting discrimination against citizens of any nation. To give no scope for the base ambition of rulers, we who hold the democratic faith must make the world safe for democracy, by showing that democracy is the surest way to economic security and to fair opportunity for all.

By taking thought and making decision to do these things now, by willing and devising the means to peace as well as the end, we shall pay the price of peace. So doing and only so doing will those of us who are living and free when this war ends pay something of our debt to those who should have been living.

APPENDIX

THE FOURTEEN POINTS (8TH JANUARY, 1918)

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter

of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiances and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

(14th AUGUST, 1941 AND 1st JANUARY, 1942)

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, KNOWN AS THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, AUGUST 14th, 1941

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other ;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned ;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live ; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them ;

Fourth, they will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity ;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security ;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want ;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance ;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

*Note :—*The common programme of purposes and principles known as the Atlantic Charter and embodied in a Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 14th August, 1941, was subscribed to, on 1st January, 1942, in a Joint Declaration by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China and 22 other States including all the British Dominions and India.

MOSCOW DECLARATION

DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China :

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are

at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender ;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression ;

recognising the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments ; jointly declare :

(i) That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

(ii) That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

(iii) That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

(iv) That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(v) That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

(vi) That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

(vii) That they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

V. MOLOTOV.
ANTHONY EDEN.
CORDELL HULL.
FOO PING-SHEUNG.

Moscow,
30th October, 1943.

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

(By MR. CORDELL HULL)

(21st March, 1944).

OUR FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL INTERESTS

In determining our foreign policy we must first see clearly what our true national interests are.

At the present time, the paramount aim of our foreign policy is to defeat our enemies as quickly as possible.

Beyond final victory, our fundamental national interests are the assuring of our national security and the fostering of the economic and social well-being of our people.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Co-operation between nations in the spirit of good neighbours, founded on the principles of liberty, equality, justice, morality, and law, is the most effective method of safe-guarding and promoting the political, the economic, the social and the cultural well-being of our nation and of all nations.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION BACKED BY FORCE

Some international agency must be created which can—by force, if necessary—keep the peace among nations in the future.

A system of organized international co-operation for the maintenance of peace must be based upon the willingness of the co-operating nations, to use force, if necessary, to keep the peace. There must be certainty that adequate and appropriate means are available and will be used for this purpose.

POLITICAL DIFFERENCES

Political differences which present a threat to the peace of the world should be submitted to agencies which would use the remedies of discussion, negotiation, conciliation, and good offices.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Disputes of a legal character which present a threat to the peace of the world should be adjudicated by an international court of justice whose decisions would be based upon application of principles of law.

REDUCTION OF ARMS

International co-operative action must include eventual adjustment of national armaments in such a manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged and that the burden of armaments may be reduced to a minimum.

MOSCOW FOUR-NATION DECLARATION

Through this declaration the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and China have laid the foundation for co-operative effort in the post-war world toward enabling all peace-loving nations, large and small to live in peace and security, to preserve the liberties and rights of civilised existence, and to enjoy expanded opportunities and facilities for economic social and spiritual progress.

SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND ALLIANCES

As the provisions of the four-nation declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.

SURVEILLANCE OVER AGGRESSOR NATIONS

In the process of re-establishing international order, the United Nations must exercise surveillance over aggressor nations until such time as the latter demonstrate their willingness and ability to live at peace with other nations. How long such surveillance will need to continue must depend upon the rapidity with which the peoples of Germany, Japan, Italy, and their satellites give convincing proof that they have repudiated and abandoned the monstrous philosophy of superior race and conquest by force and have embraced loyally the basic principles of peaceful processes.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARRIERS

Excessive trade barriers of the many different kinds must be reduced, and practices which impose injuries on others must be avoided.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

Equally plain is the need for making national currencies once more freely exchangeable for each other at stable rates of exchange: for a system of financial relations so devised that materials can be produced and ways may be found of moving them where there are markets created by human need; for machinery through which capital may—for the development of the world's resources and for the stabilization of economic

activity—move on equitable terms from financially stronger to financially weaker countries.

ATLANTIC CHARTER : RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS

The pledge of the Atlantic Charter is of a system which will give every nation, large or small, a greater assurance of stable peace, greater opportunity for the realization of its aspirations to freedom, and greater facilities for material advancement. But that pledge implies an obligation for each nation to demonstrate its capacity for stable and progressive government, to fulfil scrupulously its established duties to other nations, to settle its international differences and disputes by none but peaceful methods, and to make its full contribution to the maintenance of enduring peace.

SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF NATIONS

Each sovereign nation, large or small, is in law and under law the equal of every other nation.

The principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security, will be the foundation-stone upon which the future international organization will be constructed.

FORM OF GOVERNMENT

Each nation should be free to decide for itself the forms and details of its governmental organization—so long as it conducts its affairs in such a way as not to menace the peace and security of other nations.

NON-INTERVENTION

All nations, large and small, which respect the rights of others are entitled to freedom from outside interference in their internal affairs.

LIBERTY

There is no surer way for men and for nations to show themselves worthy of liberty than to fight for its preservation, in any way that is open to them, against those who would destroy it for all. Never did a plainer duty to fight against its foes devolve upon all peoples who prize liberty and all who aspire to it.

All peoples who, with "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," have qualified themselves to assume and to discharge the responsibilities of liberty are entitled to its enjoyment.

DEPENDENT PEOPLES

There rests upon the independent nations a responsibility in relation to dependent peoples who aspire to liberty. It should be the duty of

nations having political ties with such peoples, of mandatories, of trustees, or of other agencies, as the case may be, to help the aspiring peoples to develop materially and educationally, to prepare themselves for the duties and responsibilities of self-government, and to attain liberty. An excellent example of what can be achieved is afforded in the record of our relationship with the Philippines.

(March 21, 1944).

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE,

11TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

For the past eight days Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisers in the Crimea.

* * * * *

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the results of the Crimea Conference.

I.—THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY.

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer co-ordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

II.—THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY.

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Co-ordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces ; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism ; remove or destroy all German military equipment ; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production ; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans ; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people ; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated, will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III.—REPARATION BY GERMANY.

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognised it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

IV.—UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE.

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace and security. We

believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on the 25th April, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organisation, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

V.—DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE.

We have drawn up and subscribed to a declaration on liberated Europe. This declaration provides for concerting the policies of the Three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows :—

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise those rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated State or former Axis satellite State in Europe where in their judgment conditions require : (a) to establish conditions of internal

peace ; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples ; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people ; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated State or any form Axis satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

VI.—POLAND.

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows :—

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisa-

tion of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VII.—YUGOSLAVIA.

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasić that the Agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare that—

- (i) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupshtina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and
- (ii) Legislative acts passed by the Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

VIII.—MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES.

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments, and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers, have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation

between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organisation.

IX.—UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR.

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries, and among all the peace-loving nations, can the highest aspiration of humanity be realised—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter “Afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organisation will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

(Signed) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
J. V. STALIN.

11th February, 1945.

Note.—The foregoing Statement on the Crimea Conference was the subject of a Debate in the House of Commons on 27th and 28th February and 1st March, 1945, at the end of which a motion approving it as a declaration of joint policy was carried by 413 votes to *nil*. Earlier in the debate an amendment to the motion, regretting the decisions in regard to Poland, in respect both of transfers of territory and of “failure to ensure to those nations which have been liberated from German oppression the full right to choose their own Government free from the influence of any other power,” was rejected by 396 votes to 25.

As regards the Government of Poland, the Foreign Secretary (Mr. Anthony Eden) stated (i) that the proposed Provisional Government of National Unity to obtain recognition by the Three Powers must be representative of “the Polish parties as they are known and include representative national Polish figures”; (ii) that when the “free and unfettered elections—on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot” to which the Provisional Government would be pledged, came to be held, the British Government would be prepared to take part in international super-

vision of the elections if the Provisional Government asked for supervision. It is clear that the manner in which these elections are held and the extent to which all Poles, whatever their views and wherever they may be situated at the moment, are able to take part in the elections will be the acid test of the democratic independence of Poland.

As regards voting procedure in the Security Council (referred to in Section IV of the Crimea Conference Report), no information was available to the House of Commons at the time of the Debate.

A few days after, on 5th March, the voting plan agreed on by the three Powers and by China was published as follows:—

“C. *Voting*. (1) Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. (2) Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. (3) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under chapter 8, section A, and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of chapter 8, section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.”

Section A of chapter 8 on which the party to a dispute is required to abstain from voting is limited to the “pacific settlement of disputes” and gives to the Security Council no powers except that of recommending (presumably to the disputants) “appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.”

The second sentence of paragraph 1 of Section C deals with the settlement of local disputes by regional arrangements which the Security Council “should encourage.”

In contrast to these provisions, where it would matter little whether the interested parties voted or not is Section B of chapter 8 which gives definite powers of sanction to the Security Council. On all decisions under Section B the parties to the dispute are allowed to vote and if they are one of the five Great Powers with permanent seats on the Council they have an individual veto on every decision.

This voting plan is inconsistent with the conditions set out on page 79 above, and in the section on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals (pp. 68-75), as the conditions on which an effective organisation for world peace based on justice could be developed from those Proposals. The plan was criticised by me in a letter appearing in the *Times* of 7th March, 1945, and printed below.

“In discussing the Crimea Conference last week, the House of Commons was at the disadvantage of not knowing the nature of the agreement reached in the Crimea as to the method of voting of the Security Council, which is the pivot of the proposed world organisation for peace. Now the secret is out.

At San Francisco, Britain with the United States, Soviet Russia and China, will propose that each of these four countries and France shall have an individual veto on any decision by the Security Council otherwise than a decision as to procedure, unless it is itself a party to a dispute under consideration. If it is a party to a dispute, it shall not be able to veto discussion of the dispute but shall be able to veto any action to deal with the dispute.

This means putting the five permanent members of the Security Council above the law which is to be established for all other nations. It will be said no doubt that since they are in fact above the law by their strength, it is only realism to recognise this. That, even if it were true, would not be any justification for giving the formal seal of approval to such an arrangement. To stick to principle is the only safe guide in international affairs.

Those who prefer realism to principle may be invited to realise that, under the proposed system of voting, a small power in a dispute with one of the five Powers, however just its cause, is formally deprived of all hope of effective support by the world organisation for peace. The inevitable result of this will be that the small powers must seek security in alliances or dependence on one or other of the Great Powers. That, with spheres of influence, balance of power, competitive armaments and the rest of the old bag of tricks, is the short way to a third World War.

In the House of Commons Debate, I expressed regret that we did not know the decisions reached on this vital point at the Crimea and I urged that there was no reason for delaying to announce what the three Powers thought until they knew the opinions of France and China. There was no reason, on the assumption that the three Powers, while putting forward their views at San Francisco, would be prepared to leave decision to the Conference as a whole, and would say: 'it is the world which is going to decide not we.' The Foreign Secretary interjected 'That is precisely what we have said.' I hope that at San Francisco, if the general opinion of the smaller powers is against the privilege of the Great Powers, our representatives at least will bow to that opinion.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals are stated to be based 'on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.' The agreement now announced from the Crimea makes 'sovereign equality' a phrase without sincerity. Not in the making of such phrases lies any hope for the world of escape from the recurrent torment of war."